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The diamond industry is home to many unusual features: the predominance of an 
ethnically homogeneous community of merchants, the norm of intergenerational family 
businesses, and a rejection of public courts in favor of private contract enforcement.  This 
paper explains that the diamond industry's unique attributes arise specifically to meet the 
particularly rigorous hazards of transacting in diamonds.  Since diamonds are portable, 
easily concealable, and extremely valuable, the risk associated with a credit sale can be 
especially costly.  However, the industry enjoys valuable organizational efficiencies if 
transactions occur on credit between independent, fully incentivized agents.  Thus, an 
efficient system of exchange will find ways to induce merchants who purchase on credit 
to fulfill their payment obligations. 
 
The very features that give the diamond industry an unusual profile are 
responsible for providing institutions to support credit sales.  A system of private 
arbitration spreads information regarding merchants' past dealings, so a reputation 
mechanism to monitor merchants can take hold.  Intergenerational legacies, though 
restricting entry only to those who can inherit good reputations from family members, 
resolve an end-game problem and induce merchants to deal honestly through their very 
last transaction.  And the participation of Ultra-Orthodox Jews, for whom inclusion and 
participation in their communities is equally paramount to their material wealth, serve 
important value-added services as diamond cutters and brokers without posing the threat 
of theft and flight. 
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 Why are America’s diamond merchants primarily Jewish?  Jewish predominance 
in the diamond trade spans several centuries and continents, and activity in the modern 
day industry is most concentrated in Jewish communities populated by the Ultra-
Orthodox, a highly ritualistic Jewish sect.  This paper argues that community institutions 
within the Orthodox Jewish community support diamond transactions and generate 
efficiencies that alternative economic organizations cannot achieve.  Consequently, 
community institutions serve critical economic functions and give Jewish merchants 
competitive advantages over rivals. 
 
The Jewish community’s role in the diamond industry has helped sustain what 
appears to be an interesting paradox.  On one hand, trade in diamonds invites 
extraordinarily lucrative opportunities for industry players to cheat (i.e. steal the 
diamonds).  Liquidity constraints and efficiency considerations discourage simultaneous 
exchange, so most diamond transactions cause individual diamond dealers or brokers to 
possess hundreds of diamonds that they have not paid for.  On the other hand, diamond 
traders have systematically rejected the courts and state-created law to resolve disputes.  
Diamond merchants reliably fulfill contractual obligations without the threat of state 
intervention, and this reliability enables them to credibly commit to fulfilling the 
obligations of time-inconsistent exchange.1  Moreover, while one might expect large 
integrated firms to arise to address security or principal-agent problems,2 the diamond 
industry remains largely disintegrated, predominated by independent merchants and 
family firms.  This very paradox is what propels the Jewish community’s success: 
disintegration provides the industry’s economic actors with little insulation from market 
pressures, thus maintaining high incentive intensities for the industry’s economic actors, 
yet the community does not suffer despite lacking traditional mechanisms, such as the 
public courts or the internal policing of integrated firms, to enforce contracts.  A trading 
system that can enforce mutual exchange by fully incentivized merchants will have 
efficiency advantages over alternative organizations.  Jewish diamond merchants are able 
to organize diamond transactions within such an efficient system. 
 
                                                 
1 “Time-inconsistent exchange” is an important concept that deserves an explicit definition.  Such exchange 
occurs when parties A and B contract to exchange items of value, but time elapses between the moment 
party A gives a good to B and the moment B gives a good to A, i.e. there is a separation between the “quid” 
and the “quo”.  A paradigmatic example is the credit sale, where the buyer receives the goods and pays the 
seller at a later date. 
2 This issue is addressed in detail in Section III below. 
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 Section I begins with a fuller articulation of the historical puzzle presented by 
Jewish predominance in the diamond industry, and Section II describes with particularity 
the structure of the diamond trade and invests special attention to the unique difficulties, 
or contracting hazards, of typical diamond transactions.  Section III then briefly discusses 
New Institutional Economics, the economic theory that serves as this project’s theoretical 
foundation, and explains how community institutions can generate efficiency advantages 
over alternative forms of economic organization that have no community-based support.  
This is a critical step because explaining how ultra-Orthodox Jewish merchants organize 
the diamond trade – the central focus of this paper – is relevant only after establishing 
that efficiency considerations explain why Jewish merchants enjoy a competitive 
advantage that allows the community to maintain its industry leadership.  Section IV then 
addresses the how question: if efficient exchange involves independent, strongly 
incentivized agents, then the central challenge to diamond traders regards governance.  
This discussion examines the economic players in the diamond industry, many of whom 
are Orthodox Jews, and explains how they are induced to cooperate with fellow diamond 
merchants and, despite profound attractions to cheat, comply with their contractual 
obligations.  Section V briefly reviews how diamond networks in some other diamond 
centers – Antwerp, Mumbai, Hong Kong, and Israel – similarly manage contract 
enforcement, and Section VI offers concluding remarks. 
 
Previous Scholarship 
  
 The diamond industry is already the beneficiary of two valuable examinations, 
and several other important papers discuss related topics, such as the interplay between 
communities and market exchanges.  It is important to articulate how this paper is distinct 
from previous work and identify its contribution to scholarly literature.   
 
The first examination of transactions in diamonds was by Roy Kenney and 
Benjamin Klein, who examined De Beers’ restrictive sales policy of “block booking.” 3  
De Beers, which sells rough (i.e. unpolished) diamonds atop the distribution chain, only 
sells diamonds in heterogeneous bundles and charges a single, nonnegotiable price.4  
Thus, instead of pricing individual diamonds according to their market value, De Beers 
bundles many heterogeneous diamonds together and charges the approximate average 
price.  Kenny and Klein observed that block booking is actually a strategy to minimize 
transaction costs.  Unpolished diamonds command highly uncertain value – the stone’s 
eventual value is a function of how it is cut, to whom it is later marketed, and for what 
purpose it is used (finding the ‘right’ buyer for a given stone can substantially increase 
the sale price)5 – and maximizing a stone’s value requires a significant expenditure of 
resources in examining, evaluating, and sorting the diamonds.  De Beers policy of block 
booking allows the company to transfer the transaction costs of sorting and inspecting the 
stones to the downstream dealers who have greater exposure to market information and 
need only inspect their individual bundles.  The Kenney and Klein analysis is particularly 
                                                 
3 Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, “The Economics of Block Booking” 26 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 497 (October 1983). 
4 The distribution chain is discussed in further detail in Section IV. 
5 This very important issue resurfaces in Sections II and IV. 
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valuable in its illustration of how the diamond industry allocates responsibilities with a 
transaction-cost minimizing purpose, revealing that the generations-old industry has 
hidden efficiencies.  The transaction costs discussed in the Kenney and Klein article are 
also important to the analysis here, but this paper examines transactions that are further 
downstream than those stemming from De Beers sales.  This emphasis is on transactions 
between wholesale merchants, their brokers, diamond cutters, and end users (usually 
jewelry manufacturers).   
 
A second work by Lisa Bernstein inspects these downstream transactions and, like 
this examination, focuses on transactions in New York.6  Bernstein was the first to 
appreciate the truly unique nature of the downstream diamond industry, and her 
important work describes how diamond merchants achieve valuable efficiencies by 
shunning formal legal instruments and instead relying on reputation-based enforcement 
mechanisms.  Merchants consummate agreements governed by their own industry rules 
and resolve disputes through a specialized private arbitration board.  Consequently, 
disputes are adjudicated swiftly by individuals with industry expertise, governed by rules 
and sanctions tailored to diamond transactions, and resolved without the costly litigation 
typical of public courts.  Moreover, parties transact only with merchants with reliable 
reputations, and merchants’ reputations are damaged if they do not abide by the 
arbitrators’ rulings or if they become subject to a legitimate claim by a fellow merchant 
in good standing.  The reputation-based system punishes merchants who fail to fulfill 
their contractual obligations by denying them the profits of future transactions.  The 
diamond industry is a sharp, modern-day example of a reputation-based system of 
exchange that is much more common to pre-modern eras before reliable contract law 
took hold7 or in countries that lack effective legal systems.8 
 
However, like many pioneering articles, Bernstein’s analysis left open many 
unresolved puzzles.  One remaining question asks why the diamond industry rejects 
public courts rather than simply employing them as a supplemental enforcement 
mechanism.  This problem arises since the Bernstein analysis rests chiefly on a 
comparison of the costs of employing public law and state courts versus those of relying 
on the industry’s own rules and specialized courts, and she concludes that diamond 
merchants benefit from lower litigation costs and more accurate adjudication.  However, 
while these benefits certainly are nontrivial, this paper argues that the fundamental issue 
confronting diamond transactions concerns credible contract enforcement, not efficient 
                                                 
6 Lisa Bernstein Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 11 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 115 (1992).   
7 See, e.g., Paul Milgrom, Douglass C. North, & Barry R. Weingast “The Role of Institutions in the Revival 
of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs” ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 
vol. 2, no. 1 (March 1990); Avner Grief “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the 
Maghribi Traders” THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY vol. XLIX, no. 4 (Dec. 1989); Avner 
Grief “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition” 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 83, no. 3 (June 1993). 
8 See John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (Nov. 1999); Marcel Fafchamps The Enforcement of Commercial 
Contracts in Ghana, World Development 24, 3 (1996); Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Reputation 
Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (Aug. 2000); 
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dispute adjudication.  Wholesale rejection of public law is motivated by the state courts’ 
incapacity to govern diamond transactions.  As is discussed below in Section IV, 
diamonds impose substantial threats to transacting parties because they are portable, 
concealable, and extremely valuable.  Opportunities for theft and resale are readily 
available, and public courts are ill equipped to find and punish violators.  A diamond 
thief’s ability to escape to a distant jurisdiction and promptly sell stolen diamonds renders 
the public legal system wholly incapable – not just marginally inefficient – at enforcing 
diamond sales contracts.  Consequently, the emergence of a system of private ordering 
does not rest on its marginal improvements over the public courts; instead, as this paper 
argues, private ordering is better explained by its ability to handle the diamond 
transaction’s uniquely imposing hazards for which standard law enforcement is ill-
equipped.  This paper illustrates in detail how the diamond industry’s system of private 
enforcement reliably secures transactions that public law is unable to enforce. 
 
 A focus on the comparison between public versus private enforcement is also 
problematic because it precludes consideration of other alternative systems of economic 
organization.  Specifically, tenets from institutional economics teach that firms often 
arise to internalize transactions that present enforcement difficulties,9 yet diamond 
transactions overwhelmingly occur between independent merchants.  The diamond 
industry, then, presents a provocative case study as an industry with significant 
enforcement challenges yet with little vertical integration.  Thus, any explanation of the 
industry’s organizational efficiencies must articulate why it eschewed firm-based 
exchange in addition to rejecting public courts.  This issue makes necessary a broader 
comparison of alternative systems of exchange, provided below in Section III, that aims 
to understand the underlying transactional and organizational efficiencies that support the 
diamond industry. 
 
A final conundrum remaining after the Bernstein analysis concerns the 
mechanisms that provide teeth to the diamond industry’s private system of contract 
enforcement.  One of Bernstein’s central contributions was the identification of a 
reputation-based system in the diamond industry, and she has employed a similar meta-
analysis to uncover similar mechanisms in other industries.10  However, as it is applied to 
the diamond industry, the examination of a reputation system would benefit from a more 
detailed investigation since a traditional reputation mechanism cannot support 
cooperation for diamond transactions.  Reputation mechanisms, in which transactions are 
sustained because the one-time profits from cheating are outweighed by the long-term 
prospects of cooperation, are adequate in explaining long-term cooperation for most 
goods; for diamond transactions, however, a single defection – namely, stealing the 
diamonds – produces a one-time gain that overwhelms future profits and causes the 
                                                 
9 This principle has become widely accepted in the industrial organization literature, see, e.g., Jean Tirole 
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (MIT Press, 1988), though it originated as a 
foundation for transaction cost economics.  See Oliver Williamson MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 
(Free Press, 1975). 
10 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry” 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 
(2001). 
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standard reputation mechanism to break down.11  In this important respect, diamonds are 
unique from other commodities, and sustaining long-term cooperation in the diamond 
industry requires reputation mechanisms that provide rewards for cooperation, and 
punishments for defection, that move beyond the simple comparison of profits (since 
such a comparison will always favor theft).  This paper argues that supplemental 
mechanisms, specifically certain institutions and traditions in the Orthodox Jewish 
community, provide complementary rewards and punishments that play a critical role in 
supporting exchange in diamonds.  These community institutions are central in 
explaining the diamond industry’s success in instituting its system of private law, and 
they are responsible for Jewish predominance in the industry.  Bernstein by no means 
neglects the importance of these community bonds, and she makes mention of 
“secondary social bonds” and the role of a “homogeneous group regime” in enforcing 
reputation mechanisms.  But these factors are chiefly characterized as supplemental 
forces that support enforce extralegal contracts and remain at the periphery of her 
examination.12  The approach employed here suggests that they instead deserve to occupy 
the center.  Without supporting community institutions, the diamond industry would be 
unable to secure a reputation-based system of exchange.  Understanding New York’s 
efficient diamond exchange requires a detailed familiarity of the Orthodox Jewish 
community in which these transactions are entrenched. 
   
This paper is further informed by assorted disciplines and thus joins several other 
bodies of scholarship.  It joins a broader literature on reputation mechanisms that 
examine how contracts are enforced despite the presence of multiple trading parties and 
the absence of a reliable legal regime.13  Since most of those writings chiefly concern 
merchant circles in regimes that lack sophisticated legal systems, this paper adds the 
innovation of presenting a modern day example of successful informal contract 
enforcement.14  In articulating how community institutions serve economic functions, this 
essay joins a third body of literature that examines the economic role of social structure, 
or alternatively “social capital,”15 but the enforcement mechanisms offered in typical 
                                                 
11 As one colleague coined it, “the interesting question here is: what happens to reputation mechanisms 
when you add a lot of zeros to the equation?” Another colleague called this “the Google Effect.”  The main 
message is that standard reputation mechanisms cannot withstand the temptations that diamonds pose for a 
one-time defection. 
12 See Bernstein, pp. 138-143.  An additional limitation of Bernstein’s treatment is that her analysis relies 
on assertion, and this readily invites an empirical follow-up.  The proposition that ethnic ties facilitate 
economic transactions requires an illustration of specific mechanisms.  This examination attempts to 
provide a specific articulation – with empirical support – of how these ethnic and community enforcement 
mechanisms support exchange.  
13 See Milgrom, et al. (1990); Grief (1989); Grief (1993). 
14 Similar modern-day instances of informal contract enforcement appear in Robert C. Ellickson ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW (Harvard Univ. Press, 1991); Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth Maximizing 
Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. Econ & Org. 83 (1989); McMillan and Woodruff 
(1999); Fafchamps (1996); Banerjee and Duflo (Aug. 2000); see also Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: 
Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J. L. Econ. & Org. 202 (1997).  Many of these works 
are the progeny of Stewart Macaulay’s influential work Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 American Sociological Review 55 (1963). 
15 See e.g. Robert Putnam MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN 
ITALY (Princeton University Press, 1993); Clifford Geertz “The Rotating Credit Association: A ‘Middle 
Rung’ in Development” ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 10 (April 1962); 
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social capital frameworks and standard reputation models can only explain long-term 
economic cooperation for less valuable goods and do not apply to exchange in diamonds.  
More significant, this project articulates specific enforcement mechanisms and relies on a 
formal economic model that is not typical in works discussing social capital.  This is 
perhaps the papers greatest contribution: it is the first to introduce specific mechanisms 
and offer empirical support to explain how an insular ethnic community can execute 
economic transactions that non-members cannot.16  Finally, this paper contributes to the 
body of new institutional economics research by examining the efficiencies achieved by 
embedded governance structures and articulating specifically how some community-
based governance structures function.  It thus gives concrete substance to assertions that 
certain human relationships include mechanisms that induce cooperation.17  The 
community institutions discussed here pave the way for effective contract enforcement, 
thus allowing Orthodox Jews to enjoy efficiency advantages over large firms and other 
traditional institutions of capitalism. 
 
 
I.  An Historical Puzzle  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Jewish merchants have long played an important role in the world’s diamond 
industry.  Two Jewish brothers, living in 11th century Cairo as prominent bankers and 
diamond merchants, supplied the Fatimid Caliph Empire with precious stones.   In the 
Middle Ages, when India was the world’s leading source of raw diamonds, Jewish 
communities throughout the Indian Ocean trade routes, Egypt, Maghreb, and the shores 
of southern Europe were home to diamond traders and cutters.  Beginning in 1492, 
Sephardic Jews escaping the Inquisition in Spain and Portugal built the world’s then-
biggest diamond market in Holland and enjoyed a virtual monopoly for several centuries.  
In 17th and 18th century Germany, a sizable Jewish community in Hamburg monopolized 
the diamond trade to the courts of Europe.  And when 18th century England’s trade with 
India made London a diamond trade center, a majority of the East India Company’s 
diamond importers were Jewish.18  These high-level connections in the diamond world 
 
Shirley Ardener “The Comparative Study of Rotating Credit Associations” JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL 
ANTHOPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 94 (1964); Carlos G. Velez-
Ibanez BONDS OF MUTUAL TRUST: THE CULTURAL SYSTEMS OF ROTATING CREDIT 
ASSOCIATIONS AMONG URBAN MEXICANS AND CHICANOS (Rutgers University Press, 1983). 
16 It is, however tempting, difficult to generalize beyond the cases examined here.  The notion that ethnic 
communities enjoy significant trust-based relations that have beneficial economic consequences is not new.  
(See, e.g. Ronald Dore, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY (Stanford University Press, 1989), Chapter 9; 
Janet T. Landa “A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative 
to Contract Law” THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES vol. 10 (June 1981)).  And the dearth of 
empirical pieces explicating how these trust-based relations function in economic settings invites one to 
apply the model discussed here to other communities.  But such an application suggests that other ethnic 
communities function similarly to the Orthodox Jewish community, which may or may not be true.  This 
issue is further discussed at the conclusion of Section IV. 
17 See Mark Granovetter “Economic Action and Social Structure” AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
SOCIOLOGY, vol. 91, no. 3 (November 1985). 
18 See Solomon Grayzel A HISTOY OF THE JEWS (Jewish Publication Society 1968), pp. 426-7;  Salo 
Baron, et al., ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE JEWS (Schocken Books 1975), pp. 158-161; and Abe 
Michael Shainberg “Jews and the Diamond Trade” THE JEWISH DIRECTORY AND ALMANAC (1982) 
pp 301-311.  
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perhaps culminated with the Jewish family-controlled De Beers syndicate, which in the 
1960s managed the production and marketing of nearly 100% of the world’s uncut 
diamonds and today controls approximately 65%.19 
 
This predominance has lasted into the 20th century, as Jewish merchants remain 
disproportionately represented in the world’s diamond centers of Antwerp, Tel Aviv, and 
New York.  Interestingly, the modern-day Jewish presence in these diamond centers 
reaches deeply and most categorically into the supporting occupations diamond cutting 
and diamond brokering for large diamond dealers.  Eighty percent of all of Amsterdam’s 
10,000 cutters in the early 20th century were Jewish, and in Antwerp one third of all 
cutters and three quarters of all brokers were Jewish.  Similar percentages have been 
maintained into New York’s 10,000 diamond workers, Antwerp’s 10,000 workers, and, 
more obviously, Israel’s 7,000 cutters and 400 factories.20 21  In New York’s diamond 
industry, which is the focus of this paper, the Jewish presence is most profound at the 
ground level since the industry’s brokers and cutters are disproportionately comprised of 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews, an extremist and highly ritualistic version of Jewish practice.22 23  
The New York Diamond Dealers Club (DDC), the locus of the city’s diamond trade, is a 
reflection of how thoroughly the Orthodox Jewish influence has pervaded the New York 
diamond world and has created a unique flavor to New York’s industry.24  During any 
normal business day, the DDC’s main trading hall brings to life a snapshot from the past.  
Most traders are men with long untrimmed beards, speaking Yiddish, and dressed in a 
black suit with a black overcoat and a black hat or caftan.  The Club also serves only 
kosher food and has a Beit Midrash, where diamond brokers regularly attend daily 
worship services and study traditional Jewish texts.  Were it not for the modern-day 
building environment and sophisticated security system, the Diamond Dealers Club could 
                                                 
19 De Beers’s control of the supply of rough diamonds has declined in recent years as some mines have 
begun selling directly to diamond merchants.  See infra note 38. 
20 Abe Michael Shainberg “Jews and the Diamond Trade” THE JEWISH DIRECTORY AND ALMANAC 
(1982) pp 301-311.   
21 These figures reflect the number of workers in the early 1980s, but the current number is significantly 
lower.  Beginning in the early 1980s, Indian merchants established low-cost cutting operations that have 
supplanted much of the polishing in New York, Antwerp, and Israel.  Nonetheless, while these cities have 
far fewer cutters than they did two decades ago, Jewish cutters remain predominant in those who remain. 
22 For a thorough discussion of ultra-Orthodox Jewry, including a description of its origins and modern-day 
expression, see Samuel Heilman DEFENDERS OF THE FAITH (Schocken Books Inc: New York, 1992) 
and Silber (1992). 
23 Ultra-Orthodox Jews also play central roles in Antwerp’s diamond industry, and are important to Israel’s, 
London’s markets as well.  See section V, infra, for some discussion of these other markets.  The focus of 
this paper, however, is the New York market. 
24 There is a very small, but growing, non-Jewish component of the DDC’s 1,800 members. Approximately 
10% (up from two percent ten years ago) of current DDC members are Indian and have connections to 
India’s prosperous diamond trade.  Robin Pogrebin “Struggling to Bring Back the Glitter” NEW YORK 
TIMES August 23, 1998, section 14, pg. 1.  The Indian community’s role in the diamond industry is 
discussed infra in Section V, but it is worth noting here that the Indian merchants come disproportionately 
from a single insular sect, the Palanpuri Jain, who claim strong ethnic ties and have a tradition of family-
based businesses.  The mechanisms that enforce agreements between Jewish merchants may have parallel 
mechanisms in the Indian community.  
 While intra-ethnic exchange may rely on similar mechanisms across ethnic groups, inter-ethnic 
exchange likely relies on a slightly different explanation.  See infra note 90. 
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be mistaken for a meeting place in an Eastern European village (or shtetl) in the late 18th 
century.25  The New York Times called the DDC and New York’s diamond district, 
which spans only a single block on 47th Street, “an anachronism, a 17th-century industry 
smack in the middle of a 21st century city.”26 
 
 Jewish predominance in the industry is somewhat of a puzzle.  One possible 
explanation relies on path dependence, characterizing the modern-day presence of Jewish 
diamond merchants as a product of historical momentum.27  Several factors can explain 
why Jewish merchants traded in diamonds centuries ago.  In pre-Enlightenment Europe, 
Jewish businesses were excluded from Western agriculture and ousted from traditional 
brands of handicrafts, so they were forced into becoming suppliers of finished goods and 
credit facilities.  Jewish communities also suffered a history of expulsions and forced 
emigrations from Christian rulers, so they were drawn to professions with easily portable 
inventories.28  Jewish communities were similarly marginalized in many middle-eastern 
and north African countries and thus similarly searched for professions that required 
small fixed investments.29  The diamond trade met these conditions and thus became 
attractive to early Jewish merchants.  While these observations fail to articulate why 
Jewish diamond merchants excelled over their non-Jewish counterparts, they do explain 
why there was an early match between Jewish merchants and the diamond trade.  
Consequently, if the diamond trade is characterized by significant barriers to entry, 
internal economies of scale, or some other mechanism that allows one generation of 
Jewish merchants to bequeath their industry leadership to their community successors, 
then path dependence may be able to explain current as well as past Jewish dominance. 
 
 
                                                
There are a number of attractive features of the path dependency argument, 
including, as this paper discusses below, the observation that there are substantial barriers 
to enter the diamond trade (though no internal scale economies).  But a community-based 
path dependency argument is an unusual contention since, unlike corporations or political 
 
25 The Jewish presence in the DDC goes far beyond appearance.  DDC transactions are consummated with 
the Hebrew words “mazel u’vracha” (luck and blessing), and Jewish law plays an important role in 
arbitration hearings (see DDC By-Laws, Article XVIII Section 1.).  Moreover, the Jewish community’s 
history of marginalization in Europe remains central in merchants’ self-perception.  Writing in the 1982 
Jewish Almanac, then-Executive Director of the DDC (more prominent as a diamond merchant than as a 
historian) wrote:  
“Charting the history of Jews in the diamond industry is similar to recounting our persecuted past 
and our reactions as a people.  Jews in general have crowded into certain trades due to reasons 
closely related to being Jewish.  Many countries have kept us as socio-economically backward as 
possible due to their jealousies, fears, and outright hatreds.  These national biases have forced 
Jewish people to stay within their own districts for purposes of residence and livelihood.” 
26 Lauren Weber “The Diamond Game” NEW YORK TIMES April 8, 2001, Section 3, pg. 1. 
27 Path dependency is a popular theory in political science literature, popularized in the seminal article 
Alexander Gerschenkron “Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective” in ECONOMIC 
BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Harvard University Press, 1962).  A good modern 
example is John Zysman “How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth” 
INDUSTRIAL AND CORPORATE CHANGE vol. 3, no. 1 (1994). 
28 See Marcus Arkin ASPECTS OF JEWISH ECONOMIC HISTORY (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society of America, 1975).  See also Cecil Roth “The Economic History of the Jews” ECONOMIC 
HISTORY REVIEW, vol. 14, issue 1 (1961). 
29 Ibid. 
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institutions, diamond merchants have limited lifespans.30 31 Path dependency requires a 
mechanism that allows one generation to bequeath its industry leadership to its 
descendants.  This could take one of two forms.  Either today’s diamond merchants can 
pass along a competitive competency to their families and community members that they 
cannot confer to non-community members (or diamond merchants simply chose to never 
confer such competencies to outsides), or that Jewish community-based institutions 
themselves sustained the competitive competencies and bestowed upon subsequent 
Jewish entrants a competitive advantage over non-Jewish entrants.  These contentions 
illustrate that a ‘pure’ path dependency argument – ‘pure’ in the sense that entry barriers 
alone are responsible for the historical consequence and not competitive market forces –
relies on unwieldy assumptions.  They are based upon the implausible assertion that 
Jewish families or institutions have developed know-how that only their descendants and 
their community members are able to acquire. 
 
 A second possible explanation for Jewish predominance relies on an “ethnic 
cartel” model.32  In this model, merchants in an insular community pledge to charge 
competitive prices only to its own community members and to sell goods only at 
oligopoly prices to non-members.  As a result, entry into the market is tilted towards 
community members, causing the industry to eventually become dominated by the ethnic 
community.  The community as a whole, in turn, enjoys oligopoly rents.  Though 
community merchants would be tempted to deal more favorably with outsiders, since 
they could easily undercut fellow merchants who abide by their pledge to offer inflated 
prices, those who offer discounts to outsiders are denied future business by fellow 
community members who dominate the industry. 
 
 The biggest problem with the ethnic cartel model, particularly as it is applied to 
the centuries-old diamond industry, is that it is not an efficient outcome.  Cartels restrict 
entry and output while inflating prices, and they remain vulnerable to both efficient 
entrants and defection by members.   In contrast, the diamond industry has weathered 
over 500 years of technology changes, continental wars, and transglobal migration while 
retaining a seemingly anachronistic distribution system.  Market forces have certainly had 
sufficient time to devise a superior industry structure to unseat a Jewish regime, if such a 
regime operated under the ethnic cartel model, and it is safe to assume ex-post efficiency. 
 
 
                                                
Moreover, certain empirical observations of the diamond industry contradict 
ethnic cartel predictions.  First, though entry has been limited, history has shown that the 
profile of the diamond industry sometimes changes over time.  For example, there has 
 
30 Samuel Huntington noted “Keynes’ percipient remark that ‘In the long run we are all dead’ applies to 
individuals, not institutions.” POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (Yale Univ. Press, 1968)  
31 Bernstein (1992) may be home to a path dependency argument since it accredits current Jewish 
predominance in the industry to Jewish concentration in early diamond centers.  The past’s “fortuitous” 
coincidence is responsible for the structure of today’s industry.  See Bernstein, note 54, pg. 140; see infra 
note 36. 
32 See, e.g., Robert Cooter “Law From Order: Economic Development and the Jurisprudence of Social 
Norms” in Mancur Olsen & Satu Kahkohnen, eds., A NOT-SO-DISMAL SCIENCE: A BROADER, 
BRIGHTER APPROACH TO ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
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been impressive entry from Indian merchants in the past decade.33  Second, the ethnic 
cartel model predicts that insiders will restrict output to outside merchants, but in fact we 
see diamond merchants engage in active, competitive marketing of wholesale diamonds 
to buyers of a different ethnic community.  This suggests that ethnic predominance is 
explained not by cartel behavior but rather by a certain competitive advantage that 
community members enjoy.   
 
This paper follows a third approach that refutes the ethnic cartel analysis and 
encompasses some path dependency questions within an efficiency analysis.  Rather than 
explaining current Jewish diamond merchants as products of history, institutional inertia, 
or collusion, this alternative method presupposes that today’s Jewish merchants dominate 
the diamond trade because they enjoy efficiency advantages over competitors.  The 
inquiry then asks why Jewish merchants are uniquely able to organize an efficient system 
of diamond transactions whereas other traders are not.  If the answer hinges on aspects of 
the Jewish community that have remained unchanged over time, then it would explain 
both historical and modern-day Jewish predominance in the industry since the efficiency 
advantages that benefit modern-day Jewish merchants also would have benefited their 
ancestors.   
 
This third approach argues that there are some complementarities between the 
demands for efficient diamond transactions and the traditional structure of Jewish 
communities.34 35  The traditional social structure – very insular and ritualized 
community – remained largely unchanged in the Jewish community for several centuries 
up to the Enlightenment and continues (though with a very different emphasis) into 
                                                 
33 See supra note 24.  The proper inquiry, then, is what do these entrants have in common with those who 
dominate the industry?  This paper argues that the answer is successful entrants enjoy similar supporting 
community institutions. 
34 The question, as it is posed here, focuses on how Jewish community institutions support the success of 
Jewish diamond merchants.  Certainly, other ethnic groups could have community institutions that similarly 
aid their merchants.  While this paper examines the specific attributes and consequences of certain Jewish 
community institutions, nothing limits the social structure argumentation to the Jewish community, as other 
ethnic groups may have institutions that operate identically.  Equally possible is that other groups have 
community institutions that aid diamond merchants but through different mechanisms.  Section V revisits 
this issue in discussing Chinese networks in Hong Kong and Indian networks in Mumbai and Gujarat.  
35 A final possible explanation, one that only deserves mention and little more, was offered by Werner 
Sombert (1863-1941) in Jews and Modern Capitalism.  Sombert, attempting to refute Weber’s Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, identifies a Jewish ethos as the foundation for capitalism rather than 
Calvinism or Puritanism.  Sombert attributed Jewish commercial success to a “Jewish genius” whose roots 
lie in the “rational approach of Judaism towards economic problems,” such as Jewish law permitting usury 
for non-Jews and requiring just prices.  While Jewish law may have a role in aiding the community’s 
diamond trade (a topic discussed below), Sombert’s argument should be swiftly discarded.  First, he does 
not tailor his argument to explain Jewish predominance in specific industries.  Second, and more important, 
his argument reeks of the eugenics movement that was attractive during his time of writing.  Sombert 
reveals this bias when he pledged his support for the Nazi regime in 1934. 
 I mention Sombert here to highlight an important distinction.  Many European scholars in the past, 
like Sombert, have inquired into the causes of Jewish commercial success by asking “The Jewish 
Question”.  The approach in this paper, like other examinations of how social structure can influence 
economic performance (e.g. Putnam (1993); Dore (1989)), is starkly different.  This is an examination of 
institutions, not genes, and this methodology is applicable to other communities with similar community 
institutions. 
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modern-day New York’s Ultra-Orthodox communities.  In this important respect, it 
distinguishes itself from Lisa Bernstein’s original examination of the diamond industry, 
which argued, “The original reasons for [Jewish] involvement in the diamond trade were 
largely fortuitous.”36  While the Bernstein approach acknowledges the strong presence of 
ethnic insularity among diamond merchants, it does not argue that ethnic homogeneity is 
essential in supporting the diamond industry.  In contrast, this paper contends that the 
diamond industry found its way to Jewish communities because of efficiency 
considerations, and since the traditional social structure remains intact in New York’s 
ultra-Orthodox communities, an understanding of what generates their current 
competitive advantage can also serve to explain Jewish merchants’ historical 
predominance in the diamond industry.  Specific attributes of Jewish community 
institutions support efficient exchange, and this paper aims to understand precisely how 
those attributes create a competitive advantage for Jewish merchants. 
 
 
II.  Diamond Transactions 
 
A Diamond’s Path & Time-Inconsistent Exchange 
 
 A diamond’s path from the mine to the consumer goes through several 
intermediaries.37  The journey for most stones begins in African, Australian, and 
Canadian mines, and approximately 65% then go to the De Beers-controlled Central 
Selling Organization (CSO) in London.38  The CSO distributes its supply of rough 
diamonds through four brokers, who sell presorted boxes of diamonds to 125 specific 
merchants, known as “sightholders”, during individual “sights,” or viewing sessions, in 
London.39  These bundles are sold at a non-negotiable price, and if the sightholder 
refuses, he will not be invited to future sightings.40  Accordingly, sightholders rarely 
refuse since they reap substantial rents from their valuable position atop the distribution 
chain. 
 
                                                 
36 Bernstein (1992) note 54, page 140. 
37 In 1997, the sale of rough diamonds from mines was $6.8 billion, and the value of diamond content in 
global retail jewelry sales totaled $12.8 billion.  See WORLD DIAMOND INDUSTRY DIRECTORY 
AND YEARBOOK.  Annual diamond jewelry sales total $55 billion.  David Buchan, et al., “The Deadly 
Scramble for Diamonds in Africa” FINANCIAL TIMES July 10, 2000, pg. 6.  
38 The De Beers cartel owns the mines of approximately 50% of the world’s diamonds, with the additional 
15% entering its control through exclusive purchase agreements.  As recently as the 1990, De Beers 
controlled 80% of the world’s diamonds and controlled 100% in the 1960s.  The recent decline in market 
share resulted from mines in Russia, Australia, and Canada electing to market their diamonds directly in 
Antwerp instead of participating in the CSO cartel.  These developments, plus others (see infra note 39) 
have prompted De Beers to change its business strategy away from market control and towards marketing a 
brand name.  See Weber (2001); Emma Muller “De Beers Leads the Diamond Trade Downstream” 
FINANCIAL TIMES February 1, 2001, pg. 40. 
39 De Beers has reduced the number of sightholders over the past few years.  In 1982, Kenny & Klein spoke 
of approximately 300 sightholders.  Bernstein in 1992 wrote about 150-200 sightholders.  Recent reports 
now list 125 sightholders, and some indications suggest that De Beers plans to further reduce that number 
to as little as 60.  This is part of De Beers’ recent effort to consolidate the industry.  Muller (2001). 
40 The efficiency implications of this distribution method were mentioned briefly above.  See Kenny & 
Klein, supra note 3. 
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 Sightholders then sell their rough diamonds to a network of individual dealers, 
approximately 80% going first to the diamond bourse in Antwerp.  Then, the process of 
cutting and sorting begins, where Antwerp merchants either arrange for polishing the 
stones themselves or sell the rough diamonds to other dealers who arrange for cutting in 
India, China, Israel, New York, and other cutting locations.  Dealers continue to resell the 
rough and polished diamonds, in increasingly smaller bundles the farther along in the 
distribution chain they find themselves, until they reach a jewelry manufacturer for 
commercial sale.  Many dealers also use brokers, who work on small commissions, to 
assist these sales and find the best price for a given stone.  
 
 
                                                
The multiple transactions reflect the significant variability of valuations for 
individual stones.  Different end consumers place very different values on a given stone 
(depending both on an intended use for a diamond and on subjective judgments), so 
finding the optimal buyer for a specific stone is a very profitable enterprise.  However, as 
Kenny & Klein observe, the process of inspecting and selecting diamonds is a time-
consuming process.41  Consequently, the industry is home to many middlemen who 
create value and collect revenues merely by matching buyers with certain types of stones.  
These middlemen provide important value-added services since finding the optimal buyer 
for a given stone generates substantial profit increases.  In one day, a diamond can move 
from one end of New York’s 47th Street diamond center to the other, doubling in value 
after passing through seven or eight hands.42 
 
Accordingly, a diamond will pass through many transactions before it reaches a 
consumer.  This frequent trade and barter is typical of the diamond industry, particularly 
in Bourses that are designed to house these transactions.  In addition, diamond merchants 
display a unique zeal for these diamond trades.  One insider shared the following parable: 
 
One diamond dealer said to another, “The most magnificent diamond has come into my hands –
you simply have to buy it.” The other inspects the diamond, agrees that it is exceptional, and the 
two negotiate a price.  A few days later the first dealer finds the second and says, “Do you still 
have that diamond? I’ve never seen such beauty, and I hope you’ll let me buy it back from you.”  
They agree on a price 15% above the original purchase price.  More days pass, and the second 
dealer approaches the first and says “You know, I’ve done nothing but think about that diamond, 
and I simply must repurchase it.” They agree on a price with another 15% mark-up.  One more 
time the first dealer finds the second and says, “That diamond was so perfect – I would love to buy 
again.”  The second apologizes and informs the first that he sold it to a jewelry manufacturer, to 
which the first responds, “But why? We were doing such wonderful business!”43 
 
This story may capture the passion that dealers have for diamond trades, but it does not 
quite capture the fervor and intensity that swirl around the trading floors.  Price, payment 
schedule, method of payment, and credit security are all variables that enter into a deal.44  
 
41 See Kenny & Klein, supra note 3. 
42 Weber (2001). 
43 Interview with the author, August 2000. 
44 In one visit to the DDC, the author overheard a vigorous debate over how a buyer would pay for a 
diamond consignment.  The final phase of the debate – long after the price and payment schedule were 
agreed – had the buyer offering to pay with a certified check while the seller demanded a bank check (this 
was an instance where the transactors did not know each other and agreed to a simultaneous exchange, 
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Different proposals shoot back and forth, sometimes with brokers consulting 
simultaneously on a cell phone with the dealer they represent, and some liken the intense 
negotiations to heated talmudic debates that are typical in Yeshivas (traditional houses of 
learning) and study sessions in the DDC’s Beit Midrash.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Despite the steady stream of diamond transactions, neither the flow of diamond 
supply and nor the flow of demand is fluid.  On the supply end, there are ten CSO sights 
each year, one held approximately every five weeks.  The sightholders are required to pay 
the CSO in full within seven days of the sight, but it can take three-four months for a 
manufacturer to sort, polish, and sell all of the diamonds in the bundle.  Similarly, dealers 
who are not sightholders purchase their supply of diamonds on a cycle that follows, but 
lags behind, the schedule of sights.  They also, as well as others farther down the supply 
chain, receive their diamonds in discrete increments.  On the demand side, retail demand 
for diamonds is highly seasonal, as 30-40 percent of all U.S. sales occur in November and 
December.  Meanwhile, the pace of manufacturing, particularly diamond cutting and 
polishing, is constant since the cutting process involves one cutter and one stone at a 
time.45  Therefore, efficient utilization of diamond cutters requires polishing stones 
throughout the year, despite the irregularity of supply and demand. 
 
 Historically, diamond merchants have always had to balance capacity constraints 
in manufacturing with waves of supply and demand.  An economic boom in 1820 
Amsterdam led to the emergence of many new factories, but work was never constant 
and cutters were hired on a temporary basis while maintaining consistent work elsewhere.  
When sailing ships came into port from Brazil with rough diamonds, the factories bustled 
to cut and polish the new shipment.  And when the consignment was polished and the 
dealers scurried to sell the polished stones throughout the Royal Courts of Western 
Europe, work ceased. 
 
 Consequently, selling diamonds on credit is far more preferable than simultaneous 
exchange.  Credit sales allow merchants to balance their inventories and manufacturing 
schedules to the ebbs and flows of supply and demand.  Moreover, liquidity constraints 
are very tight for merchants since most merchants work for themselves as individuals, not 
for heavily capitalized corporations, and many dealers concede that they can get a better 
 
which is a less common but not unusual arrangement).  For both simultaneous and time-inconsistent 
transactions, considerable care is invested in even the small details of such sales. 
45 In fact, cutting technology for large stones has changed very little over the past centuries.  Cutters hold a 
diamond firmly in a metal grip and deliberately place it at a desired angle against a rotating grinding wheel.  
In earlier generations, the grinding wheel was rotated mechanically by hand cranks or foot petals, whereas 
modern grinding wheels are electric and use more sophisticated grips, but the underlying process is 
essentially the same.  The 1982 Jewish Directory and Almanac contains a dramatic illustration of this 
technological constancy: a 1850 original engraving of a diamond cutter, a 1912 picture of diamond cutters 
in an Antwerp attic, and a picture of a large warehouse for diamond cutting in the early 20th century show 
diamond cutters sitting before a grinding wheel.  One would see a similar sight in several small offices 
along 47th street in Manhattan.  (Some mechanical and high-volume processes, however, have been 
developed for smaller, less valuable stones; these processes are much more common to cutting centers in 
India and China than in Antwerp and New York). 
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price if they extend credit to their buyers.46  Efficiency considerations thus lead to time-
inconsistent exchange, where there is a separation of the quid from the quo, and the terms 
of future payment become a principal element of negotiations in a transaction.  The role 
of credit in diamond transactions is so central that Bernstein (1992) called the market for 
diamonds “an implicit capital market.”  
 
The New York Diamond Dealers Club 
 
 Nearly half of the world’s diamond jewelry sales are in the United States, and 
47th Street merchants handle over 95% of the diamonds imported into the U.S.47 
Manhattan’s crowded diamond district and its New York Diamond Dealers Club (DDC), 
the district’s bourse and the industry’s epicenter, serve as the gateway to the American 
market.  
 
The DDC is also home to a very unique and insular business environment.  
Comprised of 1,800 members, the DDC issues trading rules to govern diamond sales and 
provides a mandatory private arbitration system to resolve all disputes between 
merchants.  This private system replaces any opportunity to seek redress from a state 
court, and any member that does resort to outside courts will be fined or expelled from 
the club.48  The DDC’s organization of private law and private ordering has been hailed 
as efficient and effective governance mechanisms to enforce executory agreements.49   
 
 However, the DDC’s private arbitration system, on its own, is wholly incapable of 
enforcing agreements and is toothless in punishing diamond theft. Most of its 
shortcomings mirror the reasons public courts are also incapable of preventing theft.50  
Because diamonds are portable, concealable, and universally valuable, a diamond thief 
can easily escape to a hidden location and dispose of stolen diamonds.51  Moreover, many 
                                                 
46 An alternative to selling diamonds on credit is for a diamond merchant to seek credit elsewhere.  
However, as Bernstein (1992) explains, diamond merchants can obtain credit from each other at a lower 
cost than they could elsewhere.  First, they save the additional set of transaction costs that accompany a 
third party, such as a bank or other provider of credit.  Second, if diamond merchants transact with each 
other regularly, they have more information about the buyer’s creditworthiness than would a bank, thus 
reducing adverse selection costs. 
47 Nearly half of the world’s diamond jewelry sales are in the United States, and over 95% of the imported 
diamonds are handled by 47th Street merchants.  Thomas J. Lueck “Diamond District Tries to Dispel Its 
Private Bazaar Image” NEW YORK TIMES December 12, 1997, Section B, pg. 1. 
48 See DDC By-laws, Art. 12, Sect. 1c. 
49 Bernstein (1992). 
50 The expertise of the DDC’s arbitration board, however, is one aspect in which it is superior to public 
courts.  Diamond merchants are familiar with the process of identifying diamonds, so the evidentiary 
process of recognizing stolen goods is probably less costly in the private system than in the public courts.  
Other benefits of the private versus public system result from the DDC’s expediency, accuracy & 
consistency (products of expertise), and reduction in court-related transaction costs.  See Bernstein (1992), 
pp. 135-8, 148-151.  Of course, these mean nothing without the ability to enforce rulings. 
51 The usefulness of formal law enforcement is particularly weak in diamond disputes since a stolen 
diamond is indistinguishable to the untrained eye from another.  Interestingly, this is not a limitation of the 
DDC’s arbitration board.  A remarkable feature of diamond merchants is that they are able to recognize 
specific diamonds, thus enabling a dealer to lend one of his diamonds to another for temporary inspection.  
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dealers, particularly middleman brokers, are essentially judgment proof, so both public 
and private ordering are unable to recover restitution from a person who has squandered 
another’s diamonds and becomes unable to pay.52  The arbitration board can revoke an 
individual’s Club membership or fine him, but those sanctions are only effective if the 
party intends to continue transacting in diamonds.  An individual can ignore the board’s 
ruling if he decides never to transact again.  While decisions by the DDC’s arbitration 
committee are enforceable in New York’s state courts,53 such appeals very rarely happen 
since it resolves none of these barriers to enforcement.  Illustrating the limitations of both 
public and private enforcement mechanisms is the following admission by one diamond 
dealer: “the truth is that if someone owes you money, there’s no real way to get it from 
him if he doesn’t want to pay you.”   
 
It is revealing, given the centrality of time-inconsistent exchange and its 
associated dangers, that diamond traders rely on an enforcement system that is effective 
only on cooperating parties.  The reach of the DDC arbitration board is limited to 
restricting a diamond merchant’s future transactions – it can only act prospectively 
against merchants who place value in maintaining a good reputation.  The strength of the 
DDC’s dispute resolution system rests on the degree to which it supports reputation 
mechanisms and precludes past cheaters from future business.  The DDC fulfills this role 
by serving two extremely important functions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
When the potential buyer returns the diamond, the dealer is able to confirm that the diamond he received 
was the correct one. 
52 Concerns about payment are contractual hazards that place a risk on the seller.  A second category of 
contractual hazards involves risks assumed by the buyer.  While nearly all diamond purchasers are able to 
roughly assess the value of a diamond along the Gemological Institute of America’s dimensions (the 4Cs – 
carat, cut, clarity, and color), there are certain risks that they cannot confirm.  One example is that 
diamonds can receive laser treatments that improve the stone’s color, but a treated diamond is less valuable 
than an untreated diamond of equal color.  Since only a complex laser examination can detect whether a 
diamond is treated, a buyer often makes a purchase based on a seller’s representation.   
Similarly, a diamond’s origins cannot be verified upon inspection.  This has become increasingly 
relevant with the rise of “conflict diamonds”, diamonds mined in some African nations (particularly 
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Congo) by political-military organizations determined to overthrow a recognized 
government.  Since the conflict diamonds sales fund some of the most brutal military campaigns, many 
consumers refuse to purchase them and many jewelers refuse to use them (note: none of the diamonds sold 
by the Central Selling Organization are conflict diamonds).  They nonetheless make their way through an 
elaborate global network from the African mines to Antwerp for sale.  De Beers estimates that conflict 
diamonds constitute 4% of the world’s market, though the US and UK governments suspect that the figure 
is significantly higher.  See David Buchan, et al., “The Deadly Scramble for Diamonds in Africa” 
FINANCIAL TIMES July 10, 2000, pg. 6; Alex Duval Smith “The Gem Trail” THE INDEPENDENT 
February 13, 1999, pg. 18; Nicky Oppenheimer “Diamonds and Dictators” WASHINGTON POST 
December 29, 1999, op-ed, pg. 27.  Some mines have tried to resolve this hazard by using a laser to 
inscribe a trademark on their rough diamonds.  See, e.g., James Brooke “Canada Tries to Make Clear Its 
Diamonds Are Different” NEW YORK TIMES August 12, 2000, Section A, pg. 1.  For most diamonds, 
however, this is a contractual hazard that places risks on the buyer. 
53 A party can appeal an arbitration board decision to New York state court only if there is a procedural 
irregularity.  The board’s substantive decisions are not reviewed.  See Rabinowitz v. Olewski, 100 A.D. 2d 
539; 473 N.Y. 2d 232; see also Goldfinger v. Lisker, 508 N.Y.S. 2d 159. 
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 The DDC’s first, and foremost, function is to facilitate a flow of information 
about market participants and business opportunities.54  Indeed, this historically was the 
role of diamond bourses and their informal predecessors.  The Jewish Directory and 
Almanac writes: 
 
Diamond clubs sprang from café meeting places where dealers congregated to exchange 
information and create business.  The cafes lead to private houses, used as places for the 
conducting of business in a private and safe setting.  The origin of the word Bourse (trading 
exchange) can be traced back to the city of Bruges, Belgium in the 15th century where 
international diamond dealers met in the house of a nobleman named Van der Beurse.55 
 
This short history illustrates that diamond merchants always relied on an infrastructure to 
organize a network of dealers.  Networks first revolved around private relationships, 
either among colleagues at cafes or an intimate gathering at an individual’s home, and 
allowed merchants to become familiar with the parties with whom they transact.  As the 
industry grew, cafes and private homes could not provide the infrastructure to support the 
required information networks and were replaced with formal bourses.  Bourses now 
serve as vital fountains of information, as the need to be familiar with business partners 
remains central to diamond transactions.  When interviewed, New York’s diamond 
dealers continually emphasize their demand to know and to trust their business partners 
(sometimes an acceptable substitute is to get character recommendations from a familiar 
source that they trust).  New and unfamiliar traders are heavily distrusted. 
 
The DDC supports information exchange with several mechanisms.  First, the 
floor of the trading hall is bustling with information about parties and market conditions, 
and some traders spend time on the trading floor just to keep abreast of available 
information.  Traders on the floor will ask others about potential business partners and 
get references, and supplementary credit reports about diamond buyers float throughout 
the trading community.56  Certainly, DDC members share information outside the Club’s 
halls as well, and enjoying mere membership gives a merchant entry into a global 
information network.  Thus, the Club creates both a physical and a psychic infrastructure 
that facilitates information sharing between members.  A second mechanism is the wall 
of the trading floor.  The wall posts the pictures, background, and references of any 
visitor to the Club, providing easy referral for potential business dealings (most visitors 
also require a sponsor by a member, who is cited along with the visitor’s picture), and 
also invites comment from members regarding the induction of dealers applying for Club 
membership.  More important, the judgements of all arbitration boards determinations are 
posted on the wall along with the pictures of any party who is responsible for an 
                                                 
54 Bernstein (1992) writes, “The bourse is an information exchange as much as it is a commodities 
exchange.  As one member put it, “the bourse grapevine is the best in the world.  It has been going for years 
and moves with the efficiency of a satellite communications network … Bourses are the fountainhead of 
this information and from them it is passed out along the tentacles that stretch around the world.” 
55 Shainberg. Pg. 308 
56 The Rapaport Diamond Report collects information about all participating diamond purchasers, 
particularly jewelry manufacturers, and assigns each a credit rating.  It is the Moodys of the diamond 
industry.  Diamond dealers are very hesitant to sell to a buyer who does not have a credit rating.  
Interestingly, such credit ratings are often necessary but not sufficient to convince a seller to sell on credit, 
as most also demand a personal reference. 
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outstanding debt.  This information is shared with all of the world’s bourses, so pictures 
of delinquent debtors from across the world are prominently posted in the NYDDC 
trading hall.  Conversely, maintaining good standing as a DDC member – and preventing 
your picture from ever reaching the wall – also becomes well known and functions as an 
important information signal.  Section IV describes how this flow of information enables 
reputation mechanisms to enforce contracts. 
  
The second important function relates to the DDC’s membership.57  As was noted 
above, nearly 85-90% of DDC members are Jewish, and a visitor is struck by a pervasive 
presence of Ultra-Orthodox Jewry in the Club.  Since Orthodox Jews tend to live in 
specific, insular communities, this means that familiar business relationships are also 
familiar community relationships, and the members’ ties to each other do not end at the 
Club’s door.  Moreover, many Club members were sponsored by close family members, 
creating extended family networks within the Clubs larger community and reinforcing the 
intimate familiarity Club members have with each other (in this sense, the term ‘club’ 
accurately reflects the DDC’s culture).  The other significant contingent of the DDC’s 
membership is Indian, who comprise approximately 10% of all members and, 
importantly, enjoy family and community relationships that exhibit many of these same 
qualities.  Indian diamond business networks are also family and clan-based, and business 
dealings are deeply intertwined with private community affairs (Indian diamond traders 
are discussed at length in Section V).  Consequently, the Club’s membership profile – 
even for the small minority of non-Jews – is such that sharing information about business 
dealings is facilitated by community connections and personal relationships. 
 
Given the intimate nature of the DDC’s business community, it may not be 
surprising that the Club elects to resolve business disputes without resorting to outside 
state courts.58  Nonetheless, the predominance of time-inconsistent exchange and the 
limited reach of the arbitration board’s power pose a genuine puzzle as to how sales 
contracts are reliably enforced.  The issue of enforcement is addressed comprehensively 
in Section IV.  The main points to emphasize at the close of this section and to introduce 
the next section concern the unique nature and context within which diamond 
transactions take place.  Efficient transacting has a diamond delivered before payment, 
and the DDC is home to unique business mechanisms and ethnic connections that support 
reputation mechanisms. 
                                                 
57 The DDC currently has approximately 2,000 members, and in most years there is a waiting list for 
membership.  Dealers petitioning for membership must survive a rigorous informational review, with more 
lenient requirements governing the admission of immediate family members.  See DDC By-laws, Art. 3, 
Sect. 8., regarding entry requirements (Applicants must (1) have worked in the industry for at least two 
years, (2) comply with the board of directors’ requests for information, and (3) have his picture posted on 
the trading floor wall for ten days so members have an opportunity to comment).  See DDC By-laws, Art.3, 
Sect. 3b regarding membership requirements for immediate relatives of current DDC members in good 
standing. 
58 The flip side of the Club’s intimacy is its intense commitment to privacy and hostility to outsiders.  
Arbitration hearings are intensely secret, and Club members are extremely hesitant to share any information 
about the Club with outsiders.  Most of the author’s interviews with DDC members began with the 
interviewer asking who the interviewer was and whether he had any family members in the diamond trade.  
These were requests for character recommendations, much like reference requests commonly made to 
potential business partners. 
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III.  Discrete Structural Alternatives 
 
 
                                                
This section serves as a brief yet critical bridge between the preceding and 
following sections.  Section II illustrates the advantages of purchasing diamonds on 
credit, but replacing simultaneous exchange with time-inconsistent exchange replaces one 
set of problems with another.  While purchases and sales on credit expand the number of 
transactions a given merchant can execute within a liquidity constraint, they introduce 
multiple contracting hazards, notably the threat of late payment or no payment.  Section 
IV explains how the diamond industry’s institutions and Jewish community institutions 
team together to enforce these executory agreements, which is the central question in this 
inquiry.  The mechanisms described there, however, are not the only available means to 
ensure that the possessors of another’s diamonds do not steal or cheat, and the efficiency 
of the industry’s enforcement mechanisms must be evaluated in comparison to these 
alternatives.  This section examines the comparative efficiency of New York’s 
reputation-based system with other possible governance mechanisms found within the 
diamond industry. 
 
 The enormous and costly threat of diamond theft and the inadequacy of public 
law enforcement to punish diamond thieves limit a diamond owner to a small number of 
mechanisms that can effectively govern time-inconsistent exchange.  One monitoring 
strategy that has proven to be effective is to internalize transactions into a firm where 
managers can tightly supervise employees.  This is the strategy successfully utilized by 
diamond miners and other large-scale operations that employ many workers.  To 
illustrate, large-scale mining operations require directing workers to perform functions in 
which they will assume possession of diamonds that belong to their employers.  Mine 
operators manage this risk by confining all employee handling of diamonds to discrete 
physical locations where x-ray machines and other tools guard against employee theft.  In 
fact, some mines have earned notorious reputations for intrusive employee monitoring.  
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee criticized De Beers-operated mines 
for forcing their employees to live away from their families and in grim hostels on the 
mining site.59  Worse, the Revolutionary United Front, the rebel movement that controls 
several diamond mines in Sierra Leone, brutally restrict the movement of thousands of 
men and boys, who some have labeled “today’s slaves.”60  Such intense monitoring is, in 
part, a response to creative attempts at theft that include workers swallowing diamonds or 
hiding them in the heels of their shoes.  One racket at a Namibian mine involved pigeon 
fanciers who recruited miners to bring homing pigeons into the mine in lunchboxes and 
strap diamonds to their feet.61 
 
 
59 Alex Duval Smith “The Gem Trail” THE INDEPENDENT February 13, 1999, pg. 18,1.  In De Beers 
defense, Harry Oppenheimer, who controlled the company from 1954-1994, was an outspoken critic of 
Apartheid as a member of South Africa’s Parliament.  Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “A Diamond Cartel May Be 
Forever” NEW YORK TIMES January 12, 1999, Section C, pg. 1. 
60 David Buchan, et al., FINANCIAL TIMES July 10, 2000. 
61 Alex Duval Smith THE INDEPENDENT February 13, 1999. 
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 In addition to mining and extracting operations, large diamond cutting and 
polishing factories also use firm-based monitoring mechanisms.62  While many cutters, 
including those in New York, are self-employed and are not carefully monitored by those 
who contract with them, most diamond cutting occurs in large factories in India, 
Thailand, and China that employ inexpensive, low-skilled labor.  These large factories 
employ governance mechanisms that resemble the careful employee monitoring that 
occurs in diamond mines.63  Other diamond activity where agents are intrusively 
monitored includes diamond grading, such as is done by the Gemological Institute of 
America, where gemologists examine and grade diamonds within a closed, tightly 
secured complex. 
 
 Many diamond transactions, however, occur outside the boundaries of firms and 
are beyond the reach of firm-based monitoring.  These time-inconsistent transactions 
exclusively take place within relationships characterized by mutual trust.  The New York 
Times editorial notebook wrote: 
 
In the Diamond District, mutual trust enriches everyone.  To reach scattered customers, dealers 
trust intermediaries with stones of considerable value.  Their security is guaranteed by the 
middleman’s signature on a memorandum receipt. … On that slender record, gems worth 
thousands of dollars traverse the street, and are distributed among buyers from Bombay and 
Buenos Aires, Pawtucket and Dubuque.64 
 
This is a theme that diamond dealers continually emphasize in conversations.  Trust 
relations determine with whom they transact and with whom they contract to polish or 
broker their stones.  Moreover, large deals are consummated by handshakes and verbal 
pledges, and merchants’ livelihoods thrive on their reputations as trustworthy 
individuals.65 
 
                                                 
62 Small diamond cutting firms have enjoyed successful monitoring of employees for generations.  A series 
of fascinating examples occurred in the years during World War II, when some of Antwerp’s and 
Amsterdam’s Jewish diamond merchants and factory owners fled Nazi persecution.  Many landed in 
nations, such as Cuba and Mexico, that previously had no history with the diamond trade.  Nonetheless, 
many of these refugees were able to establish small cutting operations by employing local workers.  See 
David Federman “Diamonds and the Holocaust” MODERN JEWELER March 1986. 
63 Some of these cutting factories also deserve notorious reputations for their treatment of employees.  A 
major diamond labor union recently issued a writ complaining that thousands of diamond cutters in 
Gujarat, India worked in conditions that violated Indian labor laws.  One advocate described their 
employment conditions as “bonded labor.”  “Notice to Labour Commission on Diamonds Workers’ Plight” 
THE TIMES OF INDIA September 16, 2001.  Indian cutters are also subject to severe sanctions by their 
employers if suspected of stealing diamonds.  See, e.g., “Diamond Cutter Beaten to Death” THE TIMES 
OF INDIA May 29, 2000. 
64 Roger Starr “The Real Treasure of 47th Street” NEW YORK TIMES March 26, 1984, Section A, pg. 18.  
Many diamond merchants suggest that the dollar value of the diamonds belongs in the millions, not 
thousands. 
65 Not all transactions in New York occur within a relationship where the parties trust each other.  When 
transacting parties do not know or trust each other, sales can occur if simultaneous exchange – usually at 
less favorable terms – replaces purchases on credit.  When exchange is time-inconsistent, trust governs the 
business relationship.  The favorable terms and flexibility of credit sales are reasons why merchants who 
enjoy the trust of their colleagues have competitive advantages over untrustworthy or unknown parties. 
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 Accordingly, two distinct monitoring systems – alternatively described as trust 
and non-trust mechanisms – govern the vast majority of diamond transactions.  Both are 
discrete structural alternatives in governing time-inconsistent exchange.  It is important to 
note, however, that both systems of exchange are not readily available to prospective 
diamond merchants.  Opening a factory and closely monitoring workers involve 
technology that is likely available to any careful entrepreneur, and thus it is reasonable to 
conclude that activities that employ the non-trust system are not subject to any imposing 
entry barriers.  Indeed, diamond mining has witnessed several new entrants in recent 
decades, including the Argyle mines in Australia in 1983 and the Yellowknife mines in 
the Northwest Territories of Canada in 1991.   Similarly, diamond cutting is new to 
Thailand and China, allowing many new cutters to enter the trade, though the owners of 
these factories have tended to be long-term players.  In contrast, trust-based relationships 
are relationship-specific, and an unfamiliar entrant does not enjoy the trust of existing 
players in the trade.  While the non-trust system may be available to all, trust-based 
exchange is only available to insiders. 
 
 Section IV discusses how trust-based exchange is sustained, for trust is only the 
consequence of several instruments that can enforce agreements and punish defectors (i.e. 
trust is not exogenous).  That question, however, is only important because trust-based 
mechanisms enjoy certain organizational efficiencies over non-trust systems.  Certainly, 
New York’s diamond industry could organize exchange within the non-trust equilibrium.  
The city’s cutters would work within a large, contained warehouse where diamond 
owners would monitor them carefully, and diamond middlemen would only possess and 
sell their employer’s diamonds within a contained, carefully monitored trading hall.  New 
York’s arrival at a trust-based system – and why merchants who sustain trust-based 
business relationships, such as Jewish merchants, enjoy industry leadership – stems from 
the efficiency advantages trust-based relationships generate over non-trust relationships.   
 
 The trust-based system of exchange is more economically desirable for a number 
of reasons.  First, such exchange economizes on monitoring costs.  Mining operations 
expend significant sums on x-ray equipment, security, and other methods of supervision.  
Trust-based systems, alternatively, require expenses for mechanisms that spread 
information about individuals’ reputations.  These two different categories of 
expenditures may not lend themselves to a direct comparison, but it is safe to conclude 
that the costs to support the DDC’s information mechanisms – such as posting notices 
with pictures, or creating a common space for members to congregate and converse – are 
far less than the costs of heavy machinery and restrictive employment devices that mine 
operators and large factory owners assume. 
 
Second, trust-based exchange does not require agents to remain in a single 
location.  This is less useful for polishing since the cutter is tied to his cutting machinery, 
but because the search for the optimal buyer can create substantial value for a seller, a 
diamond owner will benefit from employing salespeople who search for buyers.  Trust-
based systems allow for such use of brokers or salespeople, whereas they otherwise 
would have to rely on buyers coming to secure locations.  However appealing this 
argument seems, it is limited by the observation that most of the world’s diamond sales 
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occur in specific, secure locations, such as the world’s bourses.  Instead of sellers seeking 
buyers, the industry often has buyers traveling to bourses or other central trade centers to 
seek sellers.  Shifting search burdens from sellers to buyers may not have any efficiency 
implications. 
 
 A third advantage of trust-based exchange, and perhaps the most compelling, is 
drawn from New Institutional Economics, which offers a system to evaluate the 
comparative efficiencies of alternative systems of economic organization.  Trust-based 
exchange occurs between autonomous agents, such as self-employed brokers and cutters, 
whereas reliance on firm-based monitoring requires internalizing diamond transactions 
within a firm and enduring the associated costs of bureaucracy.  Such costs chiefly 
include an unavoidable dilution of market incentives, and thus agents acting inside a firm 
are less sensitive and responsive to changes in price or demand than are corresponding 
agents who are self-employed.66  Responding swiftly to market information is of 
paramount importance in diamond transactions.  As was noted above, much of the value 
in diamond sales lies in optimally matching a specific buyer with a particular stone, so 
the acquisition of market information about potential buyers leads to larger profit 
margins.  The efficiency of the dis-integrated system of exchange is, in part, a 
consequence of instilling dealers with high-powered incentives to acquire this 
information.67  As a result, if a system rests upon contracts between autonomous diamond 
merchants who are fully exposed to these market incentives yet can credibly assure 
payment, then it achieves efficiency gains and has a competitive advantage over the 
integrated firm.   
 
 
                                                
Considering the comparative efficiency of trust-based systems, why then do we 
not observe only trust-based exchange, including throughout the cutting and mining 
industries?  One potential response is the rigorous conditions, and their limited 
availability, that trust-based exchange requires, such as the community and family 
institutions that are described in detail in Section IV.68  Another answer is that certain 
 
66 Oliver Williamson attributes a firm’s incapacity to mimic market incentives to “the impossibility of 
selective intervention” on the part of managers and the “Fundamental Transformation” in which non-
specific relationships acquire specificity when internalized within the firm.  Oliver Williamson 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pg. 49-50.  For a 
detailed discussion of the costs of bureaucracy, see Oliver Williamson THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM (New York: Free Press, 1985), chapter 6. 
67 There is no doubt that diamond merchants are highly incentivized (recall, for instance, the parable above 
in section II).  The halls of the DDC bustle with merchants huddling around prospective buyers and trying 
to gain information about market trends.  Diamond brokers, who are compensated with a small commission 
for each diamond they sell, are especially active on the diamond hall.  They often wait in the trading hall 
for new buyers and spring into action when one is spotted.  Others make regular visits to jewelers on 47th 
street and elsewhere looking for a sale.  Aggressive bargaining is also a staple of the trading hall and 
another indication of merchants’ strong incentives.  The intense dealings can be likened to rigorous 
Talmudic debates, and perhaps the Club’s cultural homogeneity make dealers comfortable to be blunt and 
aggressive.  Such high incentives and aggressive bargaining create lots of competition.  One dealer said 
with frustration, “Diamonds are the best deal around – there’s absolutely no room for profit!” 
68 The assertion that there is a limited availability of trust-based exchange networks is, albeit incomplete, 
very attractive.  It can explain the concentration of trust-based exchange in high-wage countries and the 
proliferation of firm-based exchange in low-wage countries. Presumably, if there were a sufficient number 
of low-wage workers who share relationships based on mutual trust, then, holding wages constant, we 
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activities, such as mining and cutting, are labor-intensive activities and invite significant 
savings from strategies that employ inexpensive labor.  Such cost savings will eventually 
outweigh the efficiencies gained from selecting a superior system of economic 
organization.  However, if trust-based exchange is superior to non-trust exchange, ceteris 
paribus, a remaining question is why there is Orthodox Jewish predominance among 
diamond merchants but not among diamond miners.  A better approach articulates why 
mining does not offer compelling efficiencies from trust-based exchange that are 
available in downstream diamond sales.  Diamonds are available for mining only in 
specific locations and are subject to the economics of property rights.69  A system that 
makes scare land resources available to numerous independent miners leaves property 
rights poorly defined and invites chaos.70  Internalizing mining activity into a single firm 
firmly establishes property rights and invites appropriate investments in land.  A dis-
integrated system, albeit with highly incentivized workers, cannot secure appropriation of 
value from land. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Property rights are, however, easily defined when the economic activity involves 
sales of individual diamonds, and a dis-integrated system of downstream diamond 
distribution, resting on highly incentivized merchants who exhibit trustworthy behavior, 
can achieve significant efficiencies. This economic potential of trust-based systems has 
not gone unnoticed.  For example, James Coleman has observed that some Japanese 
communities have used trust between transactors to enjoy secure contracts without 
diluting market incentives.  He writes: 
 
A major reason for backward vertical integration of firms, incorporating suppliers within the 
hierarchical organization, is to be able to exercise greater administrative control of scheduling, 
quality, and meeting of design specifications.  The arguments for backward integration have to do 
with transaction costs, which include these uncertainties and unpredictabilities involved in dealing 
 
would observe trust-based exchange in these labor-intensive activities as well.  But if trust-based systems 
are not widely available, non-trust systems will emerge when savings on labor and related efficiencies 
eventually outweigh potential organizational efficiencies from trusting parties.  Such traditional (non-
organizational) efficiencies are greatest for labor-intensive activities, where reducing the wage for 
employees translates into significant savings. 
Consistent with this formulation, non-trust monitoring mechanisms are concentrated in labor-
intensive activities in low-wage countries while transactions that take place between individual agents and 
rely on trust occur predominantly within high-wage countries.  Thus, the benefits of trust-based exchange 
are maximized by applying its limited availability to high-wage activities.  This approach is also 
compelling in explaining why we see diamond cutting both by independent agents (generally Orthodox 
Jews or other long-term players) and in large factories of employees.  Diamond cutting is performed by 
parties within trust-based networks, but such cutters – who have specifically acquired skills – have limited 
capacities.  Entrepreneurs must look beyond such cutters to satisfy excess demand for diamond cutting.  
Similarly, we observe that trusted cutters cut the most precious gems whereas large factory employees cut 
less valuable stones. 
69 See Harold Demsetz “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 
57, no. 2 (May 1967). 
70 Equating the creation of property rights with the disappearance of chaos was noted by Ronald Coase in 
“The Federal Communications Commission” JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS vol. 2, no. 3 
(October 1959).  Such chaos has been documented by visitors to some of Africa’s “public” lands where 
diamonds are occasionally found, where miners swing large sticks to ward off competing scavengers from 
their small finds.  See Andrew Cockburn “Diamonds: The Real Story” NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 
(march 2002) pp. 10-11. 
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with independent firms.  But integration is done at the cost of sacrificing the economic benefits of 
a market, which prevents monopolistic behavior on the part of a supplier.  Once a productive 
activity is internalized within a firm, it has a partial or complete monopoly vis-à-vis the 
departments it supplies.  Even with decentralization of organization, great difficulties arise in 
establishing appropriate transfer prices in the absence of a true market, and in the presence of the 
interests of each department in setting as high a price on its services as possible.   
Many of the benefits of a hierarchical organization without the disadvantages can be achieved if 
there is a high level of trustworthiness (in the sense of meeting design, scheduling, and quality 
obligations) on the part of independent organizations that could supply parts and services. 71  
 
Thus, “trustworthiness” combines the efficiencies of high-powered incentives with the 
security and certainty that executory agreements will be fulfilled.  The challenge to 
economists, Coleman argues, is to understand the sources of such trustworthiness and 
how it affects actors’ aggregate behavior (he laments “economics has not been able to 
cope with the social organization of trust”72).  Social structure, or other hidden variables 
that create an environment where contracting parties trust each other, is in need of much 
greater exploration and formalization.  With a certain social structure, an economic 
system can have its governance cake while eating its incentives cake.  Deciphering the 
foundations of “the elusive notion of trust” can reveal the source of significant 
efficiencies.73 
 
Following Coleman’s call for a search for trustworthiness, this examination into 
the diamond industry is as much an examination of the social structure that underlies the 
industry.  It seeks to explicate within a formal model how the social structure of the 
Jewish community is an important component of the industry’s efficiency (and, while the 
body of the argument is tailored to modern-day New York, the conclusions may be 
extrapolated to explain the Jews historic dominance in the trade; Section V discusses 
further extrapolations).  This approach reveals that the research question is not simply 
why the industry has chosen to enforce diamond contracts with private arbitration instead 
of the public courts.  Rather, the examination involves a comparison several feasible 
systems of enforcing agreements, and social structure and community institutions can 
play roles of varying prominence in the different alternatives.  In other words, diamond 
merchants have not simply chosen to “opt out” of public courts, as Bernstein writes; they 
have arrived at a distinct and comprehensive system of economic organization that 
involves highly incentivized independent contracting parties who are embedded within a 
particular social structure and are consequently able to engage in trust-based transactions.  
This unique formula of industry demands and community institutions enable this private 
system to be more efficient than other structural alternatives. 
 
This leads to section IV, which is the centerpiece of this discussion.  The logic in 
this section only holds if the diamond industry’s private institutions can enforce 
contracts.  The governance question is both the most crucial and most interesting issue in 
diamond transactions. 
                                                 
71 James S. Coleman “Introducing Social Structure into Economic Analysis” AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW vol. 74, no. 2 (May 1984), pp. 87-88. 
72 ibid., p. 85. 
73 See Diego Gambetta “Can We Trust Trust?” in Diego Gambetta, ed., TRUST: MAKING AND 
BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 213-237. 
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IV. Enforcing Informal Contracts 
 
 The diamond industry employs several mechanisms to enforce informal contracts.  
Its success is attributed to institutional complementarities – a unique combination of the 
industry’s structure and supporting community institutions.  This section first formalizes 
the contracting challenge, then introduces the particular parties involved in diamond 
contracts, and lastly models how industry and community institutions induce each party 
to cooperate.  A final discussion explores some efficiency implications. 
 
The Challenge 
 
Diamonds are easily portable and command extreme value throughout the 
world.74  While these qualities make diamonds highly desirable to consumers, they also 
are responsible for creating uniquely difficult contracting challenges.   A diamond thief 
can escape detection and find black market buyers with little difficulty.  Malicious 
intentions aside, diamond dealings also present immense temptations to otherwise honest 
merchants.  In contrast to the enormous profit that stealing diamonds offers, the 
industry’s competitiveness makes profit margins very thin and broker’s commissions as 
low as 1-2%, so payoffs from honest dealings are not large.75  Moreover, credit sales 
involve large quantities of diamonds and brokers regularly have many diamonds in their 
possession that they do not own, presenting merchants each day with opportunities to 
cheat.76 
 
                                                
The challenge in its most simple form resembles the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
formulation.77  Parties to a transaction will try to cheat their counterpart unless both 
parties know that there will be many more opportunities to play the same game such that 
the present value of future payoffs exceed the one-time gain from cheating.  The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma for the diamond transaction presents a particularly difficult hurdle 
for cooperation because cheating produces a tremendous gain whereas cooperating yields 
only minimal profits.  Cooperation becomes even more difficult to explain if it is present 
 
74 One illustration of this is the repeated observation that fugitives often transfer their assets into diamonds 
before escaping law enforcement.  A recent example is Martin Frankel, the troubled fugitive financier 
whose collapsed financial schemes prompted federal prosecution, and his attempted escape from US 
authorities.  He arranged a shadowy purchase of several million dollars of diamonds before his flight from 
the United States.  See Ellen Joan Pollack THE PRETENDER (The Free Press, 2002). 
75 Profit margins tend to vary according to a merchant’s location on the distribution chain.  Merchants who 
are perched atop the distribution chain, in particular DeBeers sightholders, likely benefit from some 
oligopoly rents and do enjoy lucrative businesses.  The paradigmatic challenge remains, however, 
particularly as an end-game problem. 
76 Cheating in the paradigmatic sense is refusing to pay for diamonds received from another merchant, but 
cheating opportunities are by no means limited to theft.  Other ways merchants can cheat – and issues that 
cause serious concern among diamond merchants – include submitting payment late and lying about a 
diamond’s quality or origin.  Note that both sellers and buyers confront these lucrative opportunities to 
cheat.  See supra note 52.  
77 See Appendix A for a more formal representation of this Prisoner’s Dilemma framework. 
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throughout a market, not just between a single pair of players, and players do not know 
with whom they will transact in the future.   
 
Given these features of the diamond transaction, trade that is unsupported by 
strong enforcement institutions is very unlikely to lead to cooperation.  Nonetheless, 
diamond merchants do not use formal institutions to enforce contracts, begging the 
question how reliable enforcement is achieved.  The secret to how the private arbitration 
system works lies in the unique incentives of the parties and their relation to the rest of 
the industry. 
 
The Parties 
 
 The driving force behind diamond merchants’ ability to participate in trust-based 
exchange is their membership to unique socio-demographic groups.  This is a system that 
bases the credibility of one’s commitments on his identity, and a merchant’s membership 
to these intimate groups is what enables him to make contractual promises that fellow 
merchants will believe.  This ability to make trustworthy promises – to commit credibly 
to a contractual obligation – is what gives New York’s diamond merchants competitive 
advantages over outsiders.  They can purchase goods on credit and gain valuable market 
information from an insular network. 
 
The diamond industry is home to two distinct categories of identities: long-term 
players, who enjoy family connections to the industry, and “diamond-studded paupers”, 
religious community members who are in possession of enormously valuable cashes of 
diamonds yet maintain austere lifestyles devoted to traditional religious observance – 
their pervasiveness is a truly striking feature of the diamond industry.  One fascinating 
aspect of the diamond industry is that a merchant’s identity tends to predict his role in the 
distribution network: long-term players are primarily dealers or buyers and religious 
paupers serve chiefly as contractors, such as brokers or cutters.   
 
The contrasting roles of dealers and contractors are illustrated by the different 
transactions in which each participates.  Section II described a diamond’s path as it 
travels from the mine to the consumer, noting that after a diamond reaches New York, it 
is likely to pass through many hands before arriving at the end of its path.  Two general 
types of transactions take place.  One could be called a “vertical transaction” that leads 
the diamond down the supply chain and occurs between a diamond seller and a diamond 
buyer.  Most of these transactions take the form of a credit sale.  The other, a “horizontal 
transaction”, occurs between a diamond owner and a hired party who provides a service.  
Hired, or contracted, parties include brokers, who search for a buyer and retain a small 
sales commission, and diamond cutters, who cut or polish a diamond for a fixed fee.78  
Both brokers and cutters assume possession of the diamond but never own it, and they do 
not give a payment or security to the diamond owner when they take possession. 
 
                                                 
78 Note that a horizontal transaction can occur ‘within’ a vertical transaction.  For a brokered sale, a 
diamond goes from a seller to a broker to a buyer.  The first transfer is the horizontal transaction, but it is 
entrenched within a vertical sale where the buyer will pay the seller on credit. 
25 
 There is some overlap between the categories.  For example, some brokers 
maintain a small inventory of diamonds and sell for capital gains rather than 
commissions.  Similarly, some dealers carry another’s diamonds and serve as a broker.  
Certain individuals do not fit neatly into a professional category.  Nonetheless, it is safe 
to generalize that all transactions could be characterized as either vertical or horizontal, 
and all economic actors fit into the roles of dealers (sellers), buyers (which include 
jewelry manufacturers), or contractors (brokers and cutters).  Figure 1 diagrams the 
diamonds path into these vertical and horizontal transactions. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
The long-term players find their paths into the industry through family 
connections.  They are largely but not exclusively Jewish (recall that many DDC 
members are Indian), and only a certain percentage of them are Ultra-Orthodox, but 
nearly all of them work in small family businesses and were brought into the diamond 
trade by close relatives.79  Their participation in the family business sustains 
intergenerational legacies that they expect to bequeath to their descendants. 
 
The contractors come from a very different mold.  These players are Ultra-
Orthodox Jews and find their way into the industry through community connections.80  
They generally are not connected to family businesses and do not build up a business that 
they hope to bequeath to a child.  In fact, these Ultra-Orthodox prefer that their sons 
commit their lives to Torah study and find financial support without having to work 
regularly; similarly, they hope to accumulate sufficient resources for themselves so they 
too can devote their time to religious study.81  
 
The important observation is that members from these very different groups are 
motivated and constrained by different forces.  Note that all parties – in both vertical and 
horizontal transactions – engage in a type of time-inconsistent exchange where delivery 
of the diamond precedes any payment.  But since the parties are from two very different 
groups, they are connected to different community institutions, are constrained by 
different individuals or institutions, have different business incentives, and have different 
tastes.82  Consequently, different mechanisms are required to induce the two types of 
                                                 
79 After nearly 50 interviews, the author has met only one diamond dealer who did not inherit a place in the 
industry from a relative, and this individual stressed that he is a very rare exception.  Other interviewees 
agree that diamond dealers can only enter the business with family introductions and sponsorship.  
80 Daily buses carry scores of workers directly from Boro Park, Monsey, and Williamsburg – all homes to 
concentrated Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities – to the diamond district on 47th street. 
81 See Eli Berman, “Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist’s View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews” 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (August 2000).  Berman describes a process where one 
generation accumulates capital specifically so their children can engage in full-time religious study well 
into their productive adult years. 
82 Just as there is overlap between the professional categories, there also is sociological overlap between the 
two groups.  Some dealers are deeply embedded within the Orthodox community and are constrained by 
the same community institutions that constrain brokers, but the opposite is not true – there are very few 
independent brokers who are not a part of the Ultra-Orthodox community.  This is important because the 
conclusion is that everyone is constrained either within the mechanisms designed for dealers or within the 
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parties to comply with their contractual obligations.  What induces one group to 
cooperate cannot explain the behavior of the other.  
 
Long Term Players 
 
 Though dealers and buyers rely on different industry skills and occupy different 
locations in the distribution system, a key commonality they share is that both are long-
term players in the industry.  Sellers have a steady supply of diamonds that they will need 
to sell, and buyers, most of whom are jewelry manufacturers, rely on being able to 
purchase precious stones to keep up with demand.  Following the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
paradigm, this long-term market participation allows the prospects of future sales to 
induce cooperation for current sales. 
 
 As was discussed above, the diamond industry introduces two important 
complications to the simple Prisoner’s Dilemma.  First, the industry involves many 
players who do not necessarily know with whom they will transact in the future, so the 
prospects of future dealings with a current business partner are not sufficiently certain to 
induce cooperation.  The second is that the extreme value of diamonds may require an 
unusually credible mechanism to assure endless exchange (a solution to the end-game 
problem) and an unrealistically high discount rate to support cooperation.  These 
complications are addressed in turn. 
 
Sustaining Multilateral Cooperation.  For cooperation to be sustained when there 
are many industry players, each player must always be induced by the prospects of future 
business with other players.  In other words, when a player transacts with business 
partner (B) in time period (t=0), he must be induced by the prospect of future transactions 
with partners (≠B) in periods (t>0).  This is accomplished by a reputation mechanism.  If 
a player’s past dealings are known, i.e. all potential business partners know whether a 
certain merchant has cheated in the past, and all merchants refuse to transact with an 
individual who has cheated, then players will be sufficiently induced to cooperate with a 
business partner even if the two will never do business together again.   
 
Illustrating how a reputation mechanism can induce cooperation under these 
conditions does not require a complex mathematical proof.  Individual players will 
cooperate so long as the system credibly promises that their long-run returns will exceed 
the potential profits from cheating.83  The burdensome features of the proof are its very 
demanding assumptions: widespread information, accurate information, and coordinated 
punishment.  These conditions are necessary for a reputation mechanism to support 
multilateral exchange.   
 
The diamond industry has all three.  Section II discussed the numerous 
information sources that educate dealers about potential business partners.  The NYDDC 
                                                                                                                                                 
social structure surrounding the hired contractors (see below).  Some who overlap the two categories are 
constrained by both mechanisms.  No one is unconstrained. 
83 The basis for this model is found in Milgrom, North, & Weingast (1990).  See also Grief (1989) and 
Grief (1993); see supra note 7. 
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is structured to support valuable information networks where dealers share information 
with each other, and the arbitration committee publicizes its decisions in order to 
disseminate its findings about who it has determined has not complied with their 
obligations.  As a result of these information mechanisms, any member can research into 
the past of a potential business partner and can learn whether he was non-compliant in a 
previous transaction.  Reputations are known. 
 
The availability of information does not guarantee its accuracy, yet the reliability 
of a perceived reputation is crucial to ensure proper incentives to cooperate.  One source 
of guaranteeing accuracy is the DDC’s arbitration board.  First, the arbitration board is 
comprised of insiders who are extremely familiar with the nature of the industry and the 
difficulties involved in entering diamond contracts.  This expertise is a valuable tool in 
ensuring the accuracy of reputation information.  Also, the board can respond to 
misinformation, not just a dispute over specific transaction, and can punish any party 
responsible for spreading inaccurate information about another’s reputation.  In one case, 
a dealer falsely accused another of stealing his stone.  He later realized that he actually 
misplaced the stone and apologized to the dealer, but the accusation had already become 
common knowledge.  The second then brought the first before the arbitration committee 
for impugning his reputation, and the board ordered the false accuser to make a public 
apology and donate fifty thousand dollars to a Jewish charity.84 
 
Another source of information accuracy is a social norm that finds its roots in 
Jewish law.  Consider the following tale imparted by the prominent 19th Century 
Rabbinic scholar, the Chafetz Chaim: 
 
A man goes before his Rabbi and admits to having spread harmful information about his neighbor.  
He asks the Rabbi what he should do to repent.  The Rabbi says “You need to do the following: go 
home, find a feather pillow, and release the feathers into the wind.”  The man follows the Rabbi’s 
instructions and returns the next day.  The Rabbi then says, “Now, to gain forgiveness, you must 
go back to your home and retrieve all of the feathers.”  “But Rabbi,” the man exclaims, “The 
feathers by now have scattered throughout the village!” “Precisely!” the Rabbi says. “And so too 
has the damage you have caused to your neighbor’s reputation.”85 
 
The Talmudic parable encapsulates an aversion to gossip, or La’shon Ha’rah, that is very 
pronounced in Jewish teachings.  As a complement to a system that relies on information 
about individuals, this community norm serves as a filter for misinformation and 
unnecessary information.  Interviews with diamond merchants confirm this norm.  Those 
dealers who do grant interviews are extremely careful not to share concrete information 
about specific individuals and share insights only at an extremely high level of generality.  
Other interviews reveal a serious deliberateness in exchanging information.  One dealer 
asked another about an unfamiliar buyer that was on the DDC trading hall.  The second 
replied, “I hear he is good.  I hear he is very good.  But don’t take my word.  Be sure to 
ask for his references and talk to members who have dealt with him in the past.”  Another 
dealer, after sharing in an interview that he had some real difficulty securing payment 
from a certain merchant (and did not name the merchant), admitted: 
                                                 
84 Bernstein (1992), pg. 127. 
85 Chafetz Chaim, SEFER CHAFETZ CHAIM (1873), Chapter 1, Paragraph 10. 
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That frustrating experience – that is the kind of information I would share with my close 
colleagues and relatives.  If they asked me about what kind of businessman this individual is, I’d 
tell them that he has given me some trouble.  But truthfully, I would only share the information if I 
were asked – I wouldn’t spread it around on my own initiative.  Also, I think I’d only share the 
information with people I knew well.  If a colleague that I don’t know so well asked me about this 
person, I’d probably just say that I don’t know anything.86 
 
Accordingly, reliable information is available upon request from colleagues, but it does 
not float around without purpose.  This point should not be overstated – teachings that 
discourage gossip will never be strong enough to overcome common frailties of insular 
communities, and they certainly will not prevent merchants from sharing valuable and 
accurate information that the system needs to enforce its reputation mechanism.  
Nonetheless, the prohibitions serve as useful information filters that extract functional 
information from reliable sources while deterring less constructive and less accurate 
communication. 
 
The third necessary condition for an effective reputation mechanism is 
coordinated punishment.  An individual will be deterred from cheating only if he knows 
that none of the diamond merchants will transact with him after he cheats.  Conceivably, 
after an individual cheats and thus acquires a bad reputation, he may convince another 
merchant to do business if he sufficiently lowers his prices (the losses from selling at 
discounted prices could be less than the one-time gain from cheating).  But this does not 
happen.  Merchants are extremely risk averse and will stay away from individuals who 
they know have not complied with payment obligations in the past, in part because their 
own reputation will suffer if they are known to transact with previous cheaters. 
 
The blockade of a merchant who has previously cheated is not necessarily a 
categorical rule.  There are instances where individual fails to comply with a commitment 
he made, and after suffering harm to his reputation, an elder merchant – motivated as 
much by compassion as by profit – will agree to a deal with him.  One dealer described 
the process as follows: 
 
There are a lot of pressures in the trade.  A dealer often has many transactions he has to be aware 
of, and sometimes he just doesn’t make the right calculation and he is left short of cash when a 
payment is due.  These actions are not condonable – all of us need to keep track of our finances – 
but they are understandable.  And when it happens to someone you think is basically a good 
person, sometimes one of the senior Club members will try to help him out and let him recover.87 
 
The elder enters into an agreement with the fallen dealer as a way to allow him to recover 
and rebuild a reputation – reputations are fragile and extremely difficult to recover once 
damaged, but rehabilitation is sometimes possible and is substantially aided if a well-
respected industry member offers assistance.  Note that such generosities are most likely 
to be effective if they are undertaken by a senior leader who commands respect from 
other dealers.  Otherwise, the action would not be a sufficient signal to convince others 
that the recovering dealer is worth a second chance.  This sort of story adds a human 
                                                 
86 Interview with the author, July 2001. 
87 Interview with the author, March 2001. 
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dimension to the otherwise very strict rules that reputation games require.  It reflects the 
balance between the serious need to deter cheating with the compassionate recognition 
that individuals have human frailties.  The challenge – a critical one – is to distinguish 
between individuals who are either untrustworthy or unreliable from those who made a 
mistake they are unlikely to repeat.88  The reputation system seems to follow the 
individuals who have the most information about the individual in question and who have 
the most experience in judging character. 
 
 Note that in this discussion of punishing individuals who do not cooperate, there 
is no discussion of the arbitration board that assesses damages.  Consistent with the 
discussion in Section II about the DDC, the arbitration system alone cannot force 
compliance and thus cannot explain consistent contractual performance.  Nonetheless, the 
arbitration board wields real power.  Its muscle lies in accurately publicizing individuals 
who fail to cooperate. This leads to a very interesting conclusion.  The purpose of the 
NYDDC’s arbitration board is not to enforce contracts; it is to maintain the accuracy of 
reputations.  Individuals only comply with the board’s rulings so they can continue to 
transact in the DDC.  The board’s decisions have no inherent power.89 90 
 
 Securing an Infinite Time Horizon and a High Discount Rate.  If cheating brings 
extreme one-time rewards, even the threat of banning an individual from all future 
diamond transactions may not be enough to force compliance.  Moreover, individuals 
present an end-game problem if their participation in the trade reaches an inevitable end.  
Cooperation is sustained only if parties have an endless future of exchanges and an 
unlikely low discount rate.91  The diamond industry’s consistent presence of family-based 
                                                 
88 This is best described as an equilibrium condition.  If there are enough people who would transact with 
someone who cheated (or simply was not sufficiently dedicated to complying with contractual obligations), 
then the effective deterrence from breaching agreements is too dilute to induce compliance. 
89 Milgrom, North, & Weingast (1990) reach a similar conclusion about the system of private judges in the 
Champagne Fairs. 
90 An alternative model that can explain sustained cooperation is if there are two (or more) groups with 
easily identifiable individuals.  If an individual from group A cheats an individual from group B, then all 
the members of group B will never do business again with the members of group A.  Consequently, the 
prospects of the whole group losing significant future business induces each group to police its own 
members and to expel any individual who behaves dishonestly.  See, e.g., Avner Greif "Self-enforcing 
Political Systems, Organizational Innovations, and Economic Growth: Genoa During the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Centuries." Working Paper, 1997.  
 Since a vast majority of DDC members are from the same ethnic group, this group-based 
reputation mechanism is unlikely to support most transactions, but it could be responsible for some types of 
cooperation.  First, it could be a plausible explanation for why Jewish and non-Jewish parties cooperate 
with each other.  This is becoming an increasingly frequent occurrence with the introduction of many 
Indian merchants to the DDC.  Second, as is discussed below, an individual’s reputation is largely 
connected to his family’s reputation.  So a group model, where individuals are defined by family 
membership and not ethnic identity, may characterize cooperation between members of different families.  
Accordingly, all parties will comply with their contractual obligations regardless of the identity of their 
business partners – Jewish or non-Jewish – to preserve their family-based reputations. 
91 Some diamond dealers enjoy sizable incomes (DeBeers would want to maintain stable downstream 
distributors and thus is likely to share some of its monopoly rents with dealers), suggesting that the threat of 
individual sanctions may be sufficient to induce cooperation.  A precise comparison between the benefits of 
cooperation versus the profits from cheating is very difficult.  Nonetheless, the end-game problem – 
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firms accomplishes both of these.  The intergenerational nature of the family firms 
extends the time horizon for cooperation beyond the limited lifespan of an individual 
dealer.  So long as a diamond dealer is concerned about his family’s reputation and not 
just his own, he will continue to have incentives to cooperate even if he plans to retire 
soon.  Parties would cheat if they knew there were only a finite number of future 
transactions. 
 
 For this mechanism to work, reputation information has to be family-specific, not 
just individual-specific.  This is, in fact, how reputation operates in the diamond trade.  
While an individual is trusted and receives business based on his reputation, a young 
dealer inherits the reputation of his family mentor.  Part of this is because the elder 
sponsors the young relative for his early dealings (i.e. the elder explicitly promises to 
cover any losses anyone incurs by dealing with his young relative), but an individual’s 
family connections and associations are very important in attracting business trust even 
when that sponsorship ends.  The NYDDC by-laws also reflect how extended family 
relationships extend trustworthiness.  Article 3, which governs the process for gaining 
membership, imposes easier membership requirements for spouses, widows, sons, 
daughters, and sons- and daughters-in-laws.92  Reputation capital can also extend beyond 
the immediate family, as cousins, nieces, and nephews of respected dealers enjoy some 
initial trust when they enter the industry. 
 
 The value of a family’s reputation has three important economic implications.  
First, if an individual entering the trade is supported by a family reputation, then he has 
an important advantage over an identical entrepreneur who has no family connection.  
The result is a powerful barrier to entry.  Observations from interviews support this 
conclusion.  Dealers repeatedly note that one way they feel they can trust an individual is 
if they know his family, and several stated that the only way an individual can enter the 
industry is if they have a relative who brings them into the family business.93  In fact, the 
presumption of a family connection to the industry – and the desire to interact only with 
individuals who have this family connection – caused some dealers to grant an interview 
only if the author had a family member who was a familiar diamond merchant. 
 
 Second, and most obviously, the family-based nature of businesses secures future 
riches for relatives holding entry-level positions.  Young relative employees who handle 
their elder’s diamonds have the very reasonable expectation that they will inherit the 
business.  This is enough to make their individual time horizons very long and induce 
them to cooperate.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
The third economic consequence to family reputations, and the one most critical 
to sustaining cooperation for multiple generations, is that reputation can be both 
bequeathed and leveraged.  If a leader of a family business has a good reputation, he can 
 
presented as each long-term merchant approaches the end of his career – forces the diamond industry to 
develop a creative solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm. 
92 NYDDC by-laws, Art. 3 Sections 2a and 3b. 
93 See supra note 79.  There are some exceptions to this rule, but very few, and even the exceptions describe 
themselves as very unusual anomalies. 
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bequeath the reputation to several descendants.  Accordingly, the elder merchant is 
motivated by the prospect of a larger number of future transactions than just the number 
he would execute if he lived forever.  So an individual’s imminent retirement is no cause 
for an end-game problem.  In fact, the opposite may be true – when a dealer nears the end 
of his career, he knows that his reputation will influence the transactions of several 
relatives.  Mathematically, this causes the dealers discount rate (δ in Appendix A) to be 
very high.  Conceivably, an individual who has many descendants could actually have a 
discount rate that is greater than 1.  This premium on future transactions is critical to 
sustain cooperation in the face of large returns from one-time defections.   
 
 
                                                
Note that in this discussion of long-term players, the role of Jewish community 
institutions is mostly secondary to the importance of family connections and industry 
rules.  This section argues that Jewish norms and the intimacy of the Jewish community 
plays valuable functions in spreading information among industry players and in 
coordinating punishment, but the Jewish community is not alone in its ability to spread 
accurate information.  The only irreplaceable aspect of the long-term players is their 
predominant tendency to be connected to intergenerational family businesses, and that 
feature is by no means exclusive to the Jewish community.  The value of family here is 
paramount, and the value of the Ultra-Orthodox participation is necessary only in the 
short-term players in the following section. 
 
“Diamond Studded Paupers” 
 
The Ultra-Orthodox brokers and cutters, who constitute the second category of 
diamond merchants, provide important value-added services and are critical in making 
the diamond industry profitable.  However, since they are much less likely to bring their 
descendants into the diamond trade, the prospects of future exchange is insufficient to 
induce them to cooperate.  In fact, because of their commitment to Ultra-Orthodox 
Judaism and love for traditional learning, they would like nothing more than to stop 
working and engage in full-time study.  Their incentives to cooperate must take effect 
within a much shorter time period. 
 
These individuals pose another interesting challenge to basic, profit-maximizing 
economic theory.  Unlike many successful dealers and jewelry manufacturers, they are 
not wealthy people.  This is striking given the industry in which they work – they have 
lots of diamonds, but no money.  Brokers do not have any real human capital, allowing 
free entry into their profession, and cutters have skills that are learned fairly easily.  Thus, 
the labor markets for brokers and cutters are very competitive and incomes are very low.  
The consequence is an observation that is striking to the observer: scores of diamonds fall 
from the fingertips of these workers, yet the rest of their bodies are covered with tattered 
clothes.94 
 
94 There should be no doubt that these workers have extreme value in their possession.  Several interviews 
proceeded as follows: 
 Author: “So let me get this strait, brokers carry around thousands of dollars worth of diamonds…” 
 Interviewee (with a laugh): “Thousands???”  
 Author: “OK, tens of thousands of… 
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These workers also operate with a tremendous degree of informality.  At their 
level of transactions, contracts are the least formal and many operate essentially paperless 
businesses.  A diamond cutter will have piles of diamonds before him, each wrapped with 
a small piece of paper and placed in an envelope.  Clients will drop off such envelopes, 
writing the owner’s name on the cover and leaving some cutting instructions inside, and 
they leave without asking for a receipt.  As I was marveling at how casually an owner 
would leave diamonds with another without written security, the cutter prepared to polish 
his next diamond.  It was the size of a grape.  He cradled it in the back of his hand, 
admiring its beauty before proceeding with the grinding wheel.95 
 
What prevents an individual from taking the pile of giant diamonds and leaving 
the country?  Clearly, diamond brokers and cutters have a set of motivations very 
different from most businessmen.  While such phenomena have traditionally been in the 
domain of sociologists and anthropologists, an economic analysis can make important 
contributions both to explain the underlying behavior and the efficiencies that the 
behavior generates.  The challenge to the economist is to connect the individuals’ unique 
motivations with rational action and characterize them in a model that assumes 
optimizing behavior.   
 
Scholars of religious sects have employed a “club good” model to explain 
seemingly non-economic behavior.96  In clubs, members have preferences both for 
standard consumption goods and also for excludable club-specific goods.  Only club 
members can enjoy these club goods, and each member of the club experiences 
externalities from each member’s behavior.  Consequently, the club will manipulate 
consumption of club goods in order to induce certain behavior. 
 
Following Iannaccone (1992) and Berman (2000),97 the club good model 
represents a club member’s utility as a joint function of consumption of normal secular 
goods, S, and participation in club-specific religious goods or activities, R.  Members 
also derive utility from the “quality” of the group’s collective religious activities, Q, 
which is an externality and rises with the number and average participation of the other 
members.  Formally, a club member’s utility is: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Interviewee: “Tens of thousands??” (another laugh) “Do you know how much diamonds are 
worth?” 
95 The conversation concerning the giant diamond followed other conversations about dollar amounts in the 
industry (see note 51): 
Author: “Wow!  How many thousands of dollars do you think that is worth?” 
 Interviewee (with a laugh): “Thousands???”  
 Author: “OK, how many tens of thousands of… 
 Interviewee: “Tens of thousands??”  
96 Berman (2000), supra note 81, describes several seemingly uneconomic practices in the Ultra-Orthodox 
community, including the expenditure of significant family resources and time to practice religious rituals.  
See Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND 
CLUB GOODS (Cambridge University Press, 1986) for a good theoretical overview of club goods. 
97 Laurence R. Iannaccone “Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other 
Collectives” JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY vol. 100, no. 2 (1992); Berman (2000). 
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Ui = U(Si, Ri, Q) for i = 1 to N members, where Q = Σi≠j Rj/(N-1) 
 
and  ∂Ui/∂Si, ∂Ui/∂Ri, ∂Ui/∂Q > 0 
 
and  U(0, •, •) = U(•, 0, •) = U(•, •, 0) = 0 
 
Only the broad themes of this model are necessary to explain the cooperation of the 
Orthodox brokers and cutters, and the most important lessons are embedded within the 
elementary assumption U(0, •, •) = U(•, 0, •) = U(•, •, 0) = 0.  U(0, •, •) = 0 means that 
an individual cannot survive without material goods or money, which is no more than a 
basic rule.  U(•, 0, •) = 0 means that an individual has zero utility if he receives no club 
goods from the community.  Consequently, he will avoid excommunication from his 
community at all costs, and more usefully, he will get zero utility if he steals millions of 
diamonds if it means he will have to live away from his fellow Orthodox Jews.  U(•, •, 0) 
= 0 has essentially the same meaning, that the individual gets zero utility if he is without 
his community. 
 
 The assumption U(•, 0, •) = 0 answers the core of the puzzle.  Ultra-Orthodox 
cutters and brokers will not steal diamonds because they either will have to flee the 
community to escape prosecution or the community will punish them by withholding 
community goods and in the most severe circumstances will excommunicate them.  Any 
of these outcomes will lead Ri = 0 for the guilty community member, i.  The variable Q 
gives the Ultra-Orthodox community the required incentives to punish unethical behavior 
since such behavior reduces each member’s utility.  As a consequence, the community 
will establish certain norms and institutions that will induce ethical behavior and punish 
transgressions. 
 
 As with the long-term players, proving that this hypothetical model can induce 
idealized cutters and brokers to comply with their contractual obligations does not require 
a rigorous mathematical proof.  The more difficult task is to find evidence of the 
assumptions underlying the model and proof that the model accurately reflects the Ultra-
Orthodox community.  The required evidence is: individual Ultra-Orthodox members are 
motivated by non-standard religious goods (i.e. that Ri belongs in the joint utility 
function), the Ultra-Orthodox consider contractual compliance to be a religious act (i.e. 
that breaching a contract lowers Ri thus, via the variable Q, reduces the utility of all 
members), and the Ultra-Orthodox have norms and community institutions that punish 
unethical behavior (i.e. the community acts to ensure that Q remains high).   
 
 Religious Goods.  Proving that Ultra-Orthodox have preferences for goods 
beyond standard consumption goods is the easiest of these three tasks.  Berman (2000) 
illustrates how preferences for religious club goods result in outcomes that appear truly 
perverse to standard price theory, and casual observations reveal that the Ultra-Orthodox 
have intense preferences for activities that are unique to their sect.  One interesting 
feature is that the Ultra-Orthodox preference for religious goods fits very comfortably 
into the notion of a utility function.  They truly gain enjoyment – the definition of utility 
– by participating in religious activities such as attending synagogue, studying religious 
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texts, and performing holiday or life-cycle rituals.  Moreover, many of these activities 
require the participation of fellow community members, thus one member’s enjoyment 
from these activities is partly dependent on the character of his colleagues.  Thus, the 
model passes a basic smell test. 
 
 The important feature of the club good utility function that compels Orthodox 
Jews to remain in their community, the U(•, 0, •) = 0 condition, also enjoys broad 
support from casual observation.  In interviews, Ultra-Orthodox brokers and cutters 
thought it absurd when asked what prevents them from stealing the diamonds.  Never was 
the answer that they would get caught – which they may, but that was not the primary 
deterrent.  Most conversations proceeded as follows: 
 
Author: So none of these diamonds before you belong to you? 
Cutter: That’s right.  I polish them and then I return them to the owner. 
Author: Why don’t you just take them? 
Cutter: What? 
Author: These are worth a tremendous amount of money.  They could support you and your 
family probably forever.  Why don’t you just take them? 
Cutter: (smiling) Where would I go?98 
 
The cutter asked the last line rhetorically and with some bewilderment that the author 
would conceive of such a question.  This sort of conversation is hard to translate into 
statistical certainties, but they convey the pervasive and unmistakable sentiment that the 
Ultra-Orthodox are deeply tied to their community.  There is no other place that this 
interviewee would want to go and raise his family.  Stealing the diamonds would 
certainly prevent him from returning to the community, and the rest of the world has no 
adequate substitute.  Accordingly, any increase in secular goods, S, that result from the 
theft are more than offset by the loss of all religious goods, R, that the thief suffers from 
leaving his community.  Such location-specific preferences serve as credible assurances 
against flight. 
  
Contractual Compliance as a Religious Act.  Ancient and medieval Jewish 
scholarship is surprisingly lacking of works in economics.  While Hellenistic and early 
Muslim scholars made progress in the early study of positive economics, Jewish teachers 
focused on legal and philosophical studies.  Consequently, “the emphasis upon ethics and 
psychology far outweighed a realistic conceptualism” and we are left only with normative 
examinations of economic life.99  Even Maimonides, the Jewish twelfth-century rational 
philosopher who codified the modern sciences for Jewish scholars, neglected the studies 
of economics, writing: 
 
“On all these matters philosophers have written books which have been translated into Arabic, and 
perhaps those that have not even translated are even more numerous.  But nowadays we no longer 
require all this, namely the statutes and laws, since man’s conduct is [determined] by the divine 
regulations”100 
 
                                                 
98 Interview with the author, August 2000. 
99 Baron, et. al. ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE JEWS (Schocken Books, 1975), p. 48. 
100 Moses Maimonides TREATISE ON LOGIC (Millot ha-Higgayon). Translation by Israel Efros. 18f. 
35 
Just as Maimonides viewed individuals’ economic behavior as a function of divine law, 
so do the Ultra-Orthodox view their economic behavior as reflections of the divine.  This 
is, in part, because Maimonides remains an important ingredient of Ultra-Orthodox study 
(thus answering an obvious question as to why a twelfth-century scholar may represent 
the values of modern-day Ultra-Orthodox).  Clearly efficient institutions such as private 
ownership and crop rotation rested on ethical and religious justifications, not economic 
reasoning.101  Complying with contractual obligations thus take on an awesome, divine 
quality.  Fulfilling one’s contractual obligations is an act that, like other religious 
behavior, is commanded by the divine law.  Fulfilling this commandment increases an 
individual’s Ri, and individuals who violate these ethical precepts reduce the value of Q 
for the entire community. 
 
 Jewish legal commandments for ethical behavior in commerce extended beyond 
contract compliance.  The doctrine of the “just price” and the theory of 
“misrepresentation” also used religious language and divine incentives to compel 
efficient behavior.  The just price doctrine led to strict rules for accurate weights and 
measures, leading Maimonides to abandon certain sensitivities and warn: 
 
The punishment for [incorrect] measures is more drastic than the sanction on incest, because the 
latter is an offense against God, while the former affects a fellow human.  He who denies the law 
concerning measures is like one who denies the Exodus from Egypt which was the beginning of 
this commandment.102 
 
Similarly, the theory of misrepresentation prohibited a merchant from overcharging or 
even undercharging for a certain good.  Jewish law carved out certain exceptions, 
particularly for items that were hard to value, but the sanction allowed the injured party to 
nullify any sale.103  While these additional Jewish legal principles don’t speak directly to 
contract enforcement, they further illustrate how Jewish law infuses commercial dealings 
with ethical precepts.  Merchants are not permitted to exploit or mislead their business 
partners, and a businessman who achieves success by honest dealings enjoys both 
monetary and divine rewards. 
 
 These ethical principles are very much alive in today’s Ultra-Orthodox 
community, as brokers and cutters draw a direct relationship between contractual 
                                                 
101 Baron, et. al. (1975). P. 49-54. 
102 Moses Maimonides, Yad, Genevah 7, 1-3, 12; 8, 1, 20, with reference to BB89b. 
103 One will generally see Jewish law adapt functionally to economic and social demands. Salo Baron 
writes: 
[The Rabbinic Tradition] made it possible for scholars to read into the established texts of Bible 
and Talmudic provisions, as well as limitations, to suit the changing needs of Jewish society.  In 
this way the people’s intellectual leaders were able to preserve a measure of continuity within a 
bewildering array of diverse customs and usages.  [In] many cases the communal leaders, rabbinic 
and lay, often personally immersed in a variety of economic enterprises and this acquiring much 
practical experience, consciously made interpretive alterations to reflect genuine social needs. … 
They thus lent Jewish economic rationales the same kind of unity within diversity that permeated 
the entire Jewish socioreligious outlook on life.  Baron, et al. (1975), p. 54. 
This flexible, functional, yet philosophically consistent approach led to a Jewish economic doctrine that 
prescribes efficiency-enhancing rules that are justified with religious and divine principles.  
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performance and ethical behavior.  The most common instance occurs when one is asked 
with whom they do business.  The answer goes beyond whether the individual is 
considered reliable and always assumes an undertone of moral judgment, such as: 
 
Who do I do business with?  Well, who do I trust?  Is the person is a good, reliable, trustworthy 
individual?  Is he an honest and decent human being?  Does he come from a good family and a 
good community?  These things are important.104 
 
Similarly, Ultra-Orthodox merchants view their actions as a part of moral example they 
assume as members of a religious community and as providers for their families.  
Another common response when asked why they don’t pursue obvious wealth by 
shirking contractual duties is, “That’s not what I want to teach my kids.”105 
 
 Critically, the ethical commitment to these community values is a two-way street, 
where potential transactors’ dedication to the principles underlying the community goods 
– specifically, the religious ideals of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community – is carefully 
weighed.  The threat of flight from the community, though extremely unlikely, is 
possible, and Ultra-Orthodox communities do watch some members leave for less 
observant communities or other Ultra-Orthodox sects.  Such defections from the 
community can dilute the effectiveness of community enforcement, and membership in 
the Ultra-Orthodox community may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition to 
induce sufficient confidence that a given community member is trustworthy with 
another’s diamonds.  Accordingly, diamond merchants will look for other assurances that 
will keep a diamond contractor committed to cooperation, such as a merchant’s family or 
social connections to the community, comparable to the requested references diamond 
merchants will ask from a long-term player.  Interestingly, Ultra-Orthodox community 
institutions do much of this filtering themselves.  Berman (2000) discusses several 
signaling mechanisms that the community institutes to determine who is worthy of 
economic support, such as an invitation to participate in the diamond trade.  One such 
signal involves the expectation that a male will remain a full-time student of religious 
studies for several years after he has begun a family.106  By the time a male begins 
assuming economic responsibilities, he already has a spouse and children entrenched 
within the community and is far less likely to depart.  Such entwinement with the 
community serves as an additional commitment device. 
 
 
                                                
Moreover, there is some thematic overlap between how the moral tone of business 
affects a merchant’s utility and how the rhetoric is employed in reputation mechanisms.  
 
104 Interview with the author, October 2001. 
105 The harsh language used by Maimonides and other commentators to prohibit unethical behavior in the 
marketplace may also contribute to the Orthodox’s meticulousness in preserving a good reputation.  Such 
meticulousness, of course, translates into economic benefits in the diamond trade, and merchants 
accordingly zealously protect the quality of their reputations.  For example, the DDC arbitration board 
allows a member to accuse another for smearing his reputation and recover damages, even if the two never 
engaged in a transaction.  
106 Berman (2000) discusses the conflicting pressures to commit many years to study while fulfilling the 
biblical commandment to “be fruitful and multiply” by marrying young and having many children.  A 
young couple frequently will live with their in-laws for several years or will receive community stipends 
until the male’s studies are complete, which may not happen until he is 40 years old. 
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One may argue that use of moral language to characterize an individual is merely an 
efficient way to characterize his reputation.  However, for the equilibrium to support 
exchange it is critical for the moral rhetoric to do more than serve as efficient 
communication; it must also have a direct impact on a merchant’s utility function.  The 
following model illustrates this.  One could imagine an equilibrium where contract 
breach is very rare, and members of the community are inclined to forgive a transgressor 
when one occurs since they know he is unlikely to transgress again.  While this would 
dilute deterrence, it would be an efficient outcome if members’ utilities were functions 
only of secular wealth and religious participation (excluding the religious utility from 
contract performance) since a punishment of withholding religious goods is a loss to 
everyone.  However, if per se contract performance affects an individual’s utility, and 
thus every community member’s utility, then there is an additional incentive to deter 
contract breach.  The equilibrium outcome would provide better deterrence against 
contract breach, and the community sentiment towards contractual performance would be 
a wealth-increasing norm.107 
  
 Community Institutions as Enforcement Mechanisms. While violating a 
contractual obligation reduces an individual’s Ri and thus reduces his utility, breaching 
his contract could still bring an overall gain in utility if the monetary gains, from a larger 
Si, outweigh the loss from the reduction in Ri.  Consequently, the community cannot rely 
on individuals to police themselves.  They must use community institutions to 
supplement enforcement.108 
 
One blunt instrument is to use rabbinical courts to excommunicate an offender.  
This is an extremely severe sanction, as the construction of the joint utility function 
                                                 
107 A similar outcome could be achieved even if there are not any negative externalities from an 
individual’s contract breach.  If an individual gained a small positive utility from every contract he fulfills, 
then the costs of losing future sales from a one-time breach are far greater than merely lost profits.  This 
additional loss in utility may be sufficient to induce an individual to cooperate, and the effect of 
externalities may not be necessary. 
108 This discussion is an effort to articulate specific mechanisms of how community institutions help 
support exchange.  It is specific example of the phenomena of Embeddedness.  See, e.g. Mark Granovetter, 
supra note 17. 
 Interestingly, the features described here are not limited to inducing ethical economic behavior, 
and the Ultra-Orthodox community uses coordinated sanctions and the denial of community goods to force 
other behavior that state courts cannot induce.  One prominent and controversial example is the plight of 
the Agunah, or “chained wife”, the woman who is separated from her husband but has not yet secured a 
divorce.  According to Jewish law, wives cannot unilaterally divorce their husbands, and previously 
married women cannot remarry unless their husbands grant them a religious divorce.  Many Husbands 
refuse to grant the religious divorce either to extort concessions from their wives or simply to spitefully 
exercise control over their wives’ personal lives.  Consequently, some communities mobilize to compel 
husbands to grant their wives divorces.  Such compulsions include the denial of community honors or 
synagogue participation, and others rely on force and threats of violence.  These are the same enforcement 
mechanisms that assume economic importance in the diamond industry.   
For an overview of the Jewish legal issues concerning the Agunah, see Bernard S. Jackson 
“Agunah and the Problem of Authority”, lecture delivered on March 13th 2001 under the auspices of the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. http://www.accentuate.freewire.co.uk/hebfont/Melilah/agunah2.htm. 
For a personal perspective of the plight of the Agunah, see http://www.agunot-campaign.org/stories.htm. 
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illustrates, but while it is rarely invoked its use is not unprecedented.109  Rabbinical courts 
are more likely to impose less severe measures, such as stripping an individual of a 
community honor (examples discussed below) or an order to make a charitable 
contribution to a community charity.  Nonetheless, the mere power to excommunicate, 
even if it is rarely invoked, is probably the most effective instrument the rabbinic courts 
have to induce cooperation.  The DDC arbitration committee itself can initiate a 
proceeding in a rabbinical court, and the close connection between the two forums 
illustrates the diamond industry’s reliance on community institutions to help enforce 
contracts. 
 
Less formal institutions also play a role in enforcing contractual compliance.  
When the community is familiar with a member’s failure to comply with contractual 
obligations, a withholding of excludable community goods, R, often occurs.  Excludable 
religious goods include participation roles in daily prayer, honors in life-cycle 
ceremonies, and access to classes or teachers that are in limited supply or enrollment in 
particularly select educational institutions (this is more relevant to a dealer trying to get 
access for his children).  Hovering throughout these specific goods is community respect, 
which certainly brings an individual direct utility but also is expressed through the 
assorted community events listed here.  One outstanding expression of community 
respect pertains to how easily – and with how prominent a family – parents can arrange 
their children to marriage.  Arranged marriage is the norm in many Ultra-Orthodox 
communities, and a family’s community status is both a leading factor and a direct 
reflection of with whom they arrange their children to marry.110 
 
Importantly, Orthodox Judaism is replete with concrete, identifiable community 
goods that have subtle hierarchies.  Small distinctions can translate into either valued 
honors or disappointing slights, and the large number of religious goods offers 
community leaders a broad menu of punishment options.  The following passage, which 
                                                 
109 Bernstein (1992) reports that the DDC arbitration board initiated an excommunication proceeding 
against Martin Rapaport, the diamond dealer who began the Rapaport Diamond Report, see supra note 56.  
The DDC board opposed his reporting of market prices, arguing that it disclosed the Club’s private 
information.  Rapaport and the board later reconciled, and Rapaport enjoys wide support as his newsletter 
flourishes.  His reinstatement perhaps reveals the DDC’s attraction to efficient information systems, even if 
there is a small cost to being unable to control some information categorically. 
110 Heilman (1992) writes about the role shadchanim, or matchmakers, play in arranging marriages in some 
communities.  “In the haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) community, the shadchan is like the college or army 
recruiter.  He or she comes near graduation time and knows exactly where and when to find prospects.”  
The central challenge of a shadchan is to find a young boy and girl who enjoy (or suffer from) a 
comparable social status, based on their families’ histories, their families’ wealth, the boy’s academic 
background and prowess, and to a small degree, their relative attractiveness.  Shadchanim make offers and 
counteroffers to the children’s parents until both sets of parents agree to a match.  “The marriage is kind of 
a contractual arrangement, a deal, with the couple having the right of refusal but little else.  But more than 
that, it is also a social arrangement, a way to locate the couple in the community, a way of institutionalizing 
their passage into the next phases of their lives so that they may stay in that community.” (emphasis in 
original)  pp. 277-286. 
Heilman adds that Ultra-Orthodox communities vary in the degree of autonomy they grant the 
children in selecting their mates.  But a young man will always consult with his parents, his community, 
and his religious teachers before making any decision.  Powerful forces combine to correlate a family’s 
community status with the quality of their children’s mates. 
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an Ultra-Orthodox diamond merchant shared with the author, is a wonderful 
encapsulation of how a community would withhold club goods: 
 
It really doesn’t happen very often, but sometimes an individual has poor judgment and is unable 
to deliver on a business promise.  Usually his business partners and he are able to renegotiate 
something fair and little damage is done, or maybe someone else comes to his aid and, for a small 
price, helps him out.  But there’s no avoiding that we knew he made a mistake and that we are 
disappointed.  We don’t try to punish him – you have to understand the financial pressures that 
come with the business and with the burdens of raising a large family.  But we remember.  So he 
probably doesn’t get shishi.111 
 
Shishi, which means ‘sixth’ in Hebrew, refers to the sixth aliyah, or Torah reading, 
during the Sabbath services.  Every Saturday morning, seven portions are read from the 
Torah, and seven individuals from the community are asked to read the blessings that 
come before and after each reading.  Being asked to say the blessings for any aliyah is an 
honor – certainly not the community’s greatest honor, but an honor nonetheless.  Some 
Ultra-Orthodox communities consider the sixth aliyah to bestow the greatest honor of the 
seven since human beings (Adam and Eve) were created on the sixth day.  So the speaker 
is saying that the community can make very small distinctions that give honor to 
respected individuals while withholding respect from others.  Such distinctions are not 
major undertakings and do not expend community resources, but they do decrease the 
utility of the individual found in breach.  They are done with deliberation, not haste, and 
the punishments are tailored to match the severity of the harm done.  They have an 
appropriately substantial deterrent effect.112 
 
 
                                                
The passage illustrates another nice feature of this form of community 
disciplining: it’s done with compassion.  Interviews reveal that there are inevitable 
interconnections between an individual’s commercial behavior and the community 
respect he subsequently receives, but the community always responds with a forgiving 
overtone.  Community members understand the temptations of ambitious deals, the 
difficulties of managing liquidity constraints, and the costs of inexperience.  
Punishments, when invoked, are accompanied with sympathy and, when necessary, some 
financial assistance.  The only requirement to accomplish the necessary deterrence is that 
the loss in utility from a withholding of religious goods, R, be at least as great as the 
corresponding gain in utility from the additional secular goods, S.  This is accomplished 
easily as long as a one-time cheat results in a reduction of R for many subsequent time 
periods.  A breach in trust, whether due to calculativeness or carelessness, remains in 
community members’ memories, and the subject in the passage above will not enjoy a 
Shishi aliyah for quite some time. 
 
 
111 Interview with the author, March 2001. 
112 The “spotlight effect” also probably plays a role in deterring a merchant from contract breach.  While a 
withholding of a community honor may not seem significant to a third party, its effect is more acute to the 
targeted individual.  This mismatch between the perceptions of the target individual versus bystanders 
allows a community to effect measurable deterrence with little effort or attention.  See Gilovich, T., 
Medvec, V.H., & Savitsky, K. “The Spotlight Effect in Social Judgment: An Egocentric Bias in Estimates 
of the Salience of One's Own Actions and Appearance” JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY, vol. 79, pp. 211-222 (2000). 
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 The remarkable features of these community enforcement mechanisms is not that 
they work perfectly – no enforcement system is perfect, and the Orthodox community 
experiences theft like all others – but that they are intimately intertwined with the natural 
community fabric.  Ethical business behavior is, simply, ethical behavior, and an 
honorable businessman is an honorable community member.  There appears to be nothing 
inherently Jewish about these values, but Jewish law and the community’s system of 
disbursing excludable community religious goods have become intimately enmeshed 
with the enforcement needs of the business world.  Such a combination of institutional 
complementarities has created a remarkably effective system.  While all of those 
interviewed noted that there have been and will continue to be merchants who cheated, 
made mistakes, or somehow deviated from their contractual obligations, these 
occurrences are extremely infrequent given the quantity of transactions and amount of 
credit in which merchants engage.  The Ultra-Orthodox have managed to institute a 
remarkably effective system without measurably adulterating their religious community. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
 Before entering the discussion in Section V of other diamond industry centers, it 
is useful to summarize how New York’s trade has overcome the dangers of time-
inconsistent exchange.  New York’s diamond merchants can be divided into two groups 
of players.  Long-term players enter the industry through family connections and are 
induced to cooperate because maintaining a good reputation invites the promise of 
inheriting the family business and later bequeathing it to their descendants.  Independent 
contractors who do not have the prospects of family legacies come overwhelmingly from 
the Ultra-Orthodox community.  They cooperate in time-inconsistent exchange because 
failing to do so would prompt the denial of excludable community goods.  This 
combination of family-based reputation mechanisms and community-based enforcement 
institutions allows New York to organize credible time-inconsistent exchange. 
 
 
                                                
The implications of this two-pronged system of enforcement is that all players 
who are trusted with another’s diamonds must belong to one of the two categories and be 
subject to its respective punishment devices.  The system embodies what Yoram Ben-
Porath called “the F-Connection” where trade networks organized around families and 
friends (i.e. community members) can execute implicit contracts that enjoy efficiencies 
unavailable to formal, arms-length transactions.113  However, when phrased in 
generalizable language or in an overarching model (such as the model articulated by Ben-
Porath), it would seem that these unique transactional features and enforcement 
mechanisms are not limited to Jewish family connections and Ultra-Orthodox Jewish 
community membership.  Nothing appears to preclude successful enforcement of 
informal contracts between non-Jews and non-Orthodox Jews so long as either family or 
community connections assure cooperation, and nothing limits enforcement mechanisms 
to the type employed by the Ultra-Orthodox in New York.   
 
 
113 Yoram Ben-Porath “The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the Organization of Exchange” 
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 1980). 
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An important question then emerges: if the mechanisms do not appear to be 
specific to Jewish merchants, why is there Jewish predominance in the industry?   This is 
a difficult question to answer, particularly because – as Section V illustrates – other 
communities appear to have developed private enforcement mechanisms and thus enter 
into the diamond industry.  Perhaps while Jewish family or community connections may 
not be necessary, core features of Jewish history and the traditional organization of the 
Jewish community can explain why Jewish merchants were more likely than other ethnic 
groups to dominate the diamond trade.  Section I discussed why medieval Jewish 
merchants were attracted to trades with portable commodities, and the benefits of 
intergenerational family businesses tended to keep certain families and ethnicities within 
the industry while leaving others out.  While Section I notes that a path dependency 
argument does not appreciate how the industry’s organization economizes on transaction 
costs and enjoys efficiencies from time-inconsistent exchange, intergenerational 
connections do impose significant entry barriers that create a trajectory where today’s 
industry players are the descendants of past leaders.  Furthermore, Section IV discusses 
features within the Ultra-Orthodox that create incentives to identify uncooperative 
businessmen and provide a capacity to issue coordinated punishments.  Religion-based 
norms facilitate the sharing of personal information – and ensure the accuracy of such 
information – and establish a critical link between merchants’ business reputations and 
their community standing.  Jewish law further espouses values that easily support 
reputation-based systems of exchange, and the insularity of the community establishes 
clear demarcations that distinguish trustworthy insiders from unfamiliar outsiders.  
Frequent participation in religious activities creates a widespread demand among the 
Ultra-Orthodox for excludable religious goods, the ritualistic nature of Ultra-Orthodox 
religious practice makes these religious goods easily identifiable and discernable, and the 
structure of religious life provides concrete systems that disburse – and importantly, 
withhold – these excludable club goods.  Finally, the paramount personal importance of 
religious life in an irreplaceable community and the thorough entanglement of 
community members with community institutions virtually preclude the risk of flight.  
Other communities may house similar mechanisms, but these community features reach a 
complexity and precision that are difficult to replicate, suggesting that the traditional 
Jewish community is particularly situated to support the enforcement of informal 
contracts.   
 
In sum, Jewish history illustrates why Jewish merchants were attracted to the 
diamond trade, Jewish community institutions can help explain why Jewish communities 
were particularly able to enforce informal contracts, and the advantages of 
intergenerational firms sustained early Jewish industry leadership.  The traditional Jewish 
community does not enjoy a monopoly over these traits, but the combination of these 
factors offer a plausible explanation why Jewish merchants usurped and maintain 
industry leadership.  Since the diamond trade is also home to many non-Jewish 
merchants, they too must be subject to either family or community enforcement 
mechanisms.  The following section tests these implications in other settings that 
confront the same contractual hazards. 
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V. Other Settings for Informal Contracts 
 
The success of the Ultra-Orthodox in enforcing informal contracts mirrors the 
success of other ethnically homogeneous communities who have built prosperous 
networks of commerce.  One prominent and well-studied example is Chinese family 
businesses in Southeast Asia.114  In both Jewish and Chinese networks, community 
members serve as brokers between merchants and execute time-inconsistent exchange 
without relying on formal court ordering.  Some have generalized to construct a 
comprehensive theory on the “Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group” (EHMG),115 
but this is not to presuppose that these extremely different communities employ similar 
enforcement mechanisms.  However, while New York’s Ultra-Orthodox and Java’s 
Chinese may have similarly insular communities and closely knit families, it is hard to 
imagine that these communities with very different cultures and ethnic heritages employ 
the same enforcement mechanisms.  The arrival at a broad theory may be premature. 
 
Nonetheless, diamond transactions present the same contracting challenges 
regardless of the identity of the transacting parties, and the presence of non-Jewish 
diamond merchants, even if they do not control a market share as large as their Jewish 
counterparts, present a test to the implications from Section IV.  If either a family or a 
community connection were required to support time-inconsistent exchange, then the 
same institutional conditions would be present in other diamond centers populated by 
different ethnic and national groups.  Examining these and other instances where 
informal contracts are an efficient method of economic organization can serve as a quasi-
empirical test to the Section IV argument.116 
 
Antwerp 
 
 Belgium’s diamond trade traces its roots to the port city of Bruges, where 
merchants began importing diamonds from India in the Middle Ages.  Shipping traffic 
shifted to nearby Antwerp in the late 14th century, and with Vasco da Gama’s discovery 
in 1498 of a direct sea route to India, the Lisbon-Antwerp route to India gained 
popularity.  Antwerp’s leadership in diamonds came in the 15th and 16th century when 
Jewish cutters were expelled from Spain and Portugal and fled to Antwerp and 
Amsterdam.  Antwerp yielded global leadership to Amsterdam when Spanish attacks in 
1585 drove away many merchants, but its trade revitalized when diamonds were 
                                                 
114 See, e.g., Alice G. Dewey PEASANT MARKETING IN JAVA (1962); Cyril S. Belshaw 
TRADITIONAL EXCHANGE AND MODERN MARKETS (1965); Murray Wiedenbaum & Samuel 
Hughes THE BAMBOO NETWORK: HOW EXPATRIATE CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS ARE 
CREATING A NEW ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER IN ASIA (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1996). 
115 Landa (1981). 
116 A structural comparison of the different diamond centers is far from an ideal test.  A formal, empirical 
analysis is more reliable, and testing the hypotheses developed in Section IV on observations from other 
diamond communities is extrapolation.  A preferred test would mirror the methods employed by McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999) or Banerjee and Duflo (2000), see supra note 8, in which survey data is obtained from 
a specific merchant community and allow for empirical tests.  Unfortunately, due to the extremely secretive 
and closed nature of the Jewish diamond world, collecting reliable data from Jewish merchants is 
unfeasible.  Instead, this study relies on the anecdotal evidence supplied in Section IV and the investigation 
into other diamond centers in Section V. 
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discovered in South Africa in 1870, and a dispute between diamond merchants and the 
Dutch government further caused the trade to move back to Antwerp.  While Antwerp 
Jewry was largely decimated in World War II, 500 dealers transferred the city’s 
diamonds to London during the German occupation and allowed the city’s industry to 
revive after the War. 
 
 Of all the world’s diamond centers, Antwerp most closely resembles New York.  
The city’s diamond trade is dominated by 1,600 family-based companies whose members 
largely belong to three distinct ethnic groups: native Belgian, Jewish, and Indian.  While 
the Indian traders are relatively recent arrivals, as they are in New York, the Jewish and 
Belgian family businesses have long histories in the country, and many of the Belgian 
families trace their roots to the original traders in Bruges.  The family businesses are 
concentrated around four interconnected bourses that, like the NYDDC, have arbitration 
systems and serve primarily as a central meeting place.  In short, Antwerp’s industry rests 
on long-term players in intergenerational family businesses and institutions to share 
information and support reputation mechanisms. 
 
 Also like New York’s trade, Antwerp’s brokers and cutters have been 
predominantly Orthodox Jews.  In the beginning of the 20th century, Jews constituted 
three quarters of the city’s diamond brokers and an even higher percentage of the factory 
owners.  Today, cutting factories in India, enjoying cheaper labor costs, have supplanted 
most of the cutting in Antwerp, and the city has seen its peak of 30,000 workers fall to 
less than 3,000.  Nonetheless, the Ultra-Orthodox presence remains strong in Antwerp, as 
Ultra-Orthodox continue to serve as brokers and providing other services to the Jewish 
family businesses. 
 
 Antwerp’s trade fits neatly into the model prescribed by New York’s trade.  
Diamond merchants belong to family-based companies who have been involved in the 
trade for centuries, and Orthodox Jews predominantly serve as the city’s cutters and 
brokers. 
 
Mumbai 
 
 For nearly two and one half millennia, from the first discoveries in 800 B.C. to the 
diamond finds in Brazil in 1844, the Indian subcontinent was the world’s only source of 
diamonds.  Thus began a remarkable history in diamonds and gemstones.  Indian mines 
have produced some of the world’s most famous diamonds, including the Koh-i-Nur, 
which was the object of tribal battles from 1304 through 1850, when the East India 
Company presented it to Queen Victoria (it later adorned the crown worn by Queens 
Alexandria, Mary, and Elizabeth), and the Hope Diamond, which was purchased by King 
Louis XIV, stolen in the French Revolution, and eventually repurchased by Harry 
Winston who later donated it to the Smithsonian. 
 
 Despite this illustrious history, however, Indian diamond merchants did not have 
a major impact on the global market until the mid-1970s.  Only then did Indian diamond 
merchants translate their diamond expertise into major cutting operations that, only one 
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decade later, developed into global trading networks that captured large shares of the 
international market.  Bharat Shah, founder and chairman of India’s largest private 
empire, boasted “We went to the bottom end of the market, buying and cutting diamonds 
which the Jews had rejected” and set up large cutting operations specializing in small 
stones.117  Now, Mumbai is home to an active bourse, and thousands of cutting factories 
populate nearby Gujarat province.  Over 700,000 Indians work as diamond cutters118 
polishing nine out of every ten stones sold in the global market.119  
 
 Like their Jewish counterparts, Indian diamond merchants rely on both family and 
community connections to support their trading networks.  Family connections are 
evident in each Indian company, regardless of its location.  Basant Johari, Chairman of 
the Indian Diamond and Colorstones Association (a New York trade group), reported, 
“My father was in the diamond and gemstone business, and his father was too, as was his 
father and his father before him….  The business goes back in my family generation after 
generation for centuries.  All of today’s merchants have the same family story.”120  In 
addition to having vertical roots, current family networks reach horizontally by 
positioning relatives in all the important diamond centers.  Gita Piramal, an Indian 
business historian, describes one such network:  
 
Buying roughs in London, an Indian sends them to his brother in Bombay who after polishing 
them, forwards them to another brother in Antwerp, who in turn instructs cousins in New York 
and Hong Kong to sell them to jewelry manufacturers.121 
 
 
                                                
The diamond connections also rest on community and tribal foundations, as a 
small ethnic minority has dominated India’s diamond industry.  For centuries, the Jains of 
Palanpur, a religious minority (Jainism, an offshoot of Buddhism, accounts for 0.5% of 
all Indians) from a parched, dusty village in northern Gujarat, have served as India’s 
diamontares.  Palanpuris developed their roots in the diamond industry as diamond 
cutters, and while there were some non-Palanpuri family diamond businesses, the 
Palanpuri controlled all cutting know-how.122  Before India’s diamond boom, Palanpuri 
cutters owned and operated their own small units and remained unconnected to market 
dominated by cutters in Israel and Antwerp.  This cutting expertise was harnessed to 
propel India’s global expansion, as entrepreneurial Palanpuris turned to the master 
 
117 Gita Piramal BUSINESS MAHARAJAS (Penguin Books, 1996). 
118 Nicky Oppenheimer, 1999. 
119 Manjeet Kripalani “Polishing India’s Diamond Business” BUSINESS WEEK September 11, 2000, pg. 
126, E8.  Note that this statistic reflects the number of stones cut, not the market share value they represent 
(which is substantially less than 90%).  Also, this figure further overstates the role of India’s cutting since 
some  stones are polished several times. 
120 Interview with the author, February 2002. 
121 Gita Piramal “Sparkle on Indian Diamond Market Dims” FINANCIAL TIMES June 19, 1990, pg. 8.  
One diamond merchant lamented to Paramal, “This business demands personal attention and trust.  Only 
your family can give both.  I have remained a small diamond exporter because I do not have a brother 
whom I can send to live in Antwerp.”  ibid. 
122 Compare this to the similar role of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish merchants, who also enjoy particular 
dominance in the value-added services.   The model developed in Section IV does not necessarily suggest 
that community connections govern value-added services and family connections govern trading and 
dealing, but this seems to be the global pattern. 
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craftsmen in their home villages to guide their cutting operations.  While many of today’s 
cutting operations are large factories that utilize non-trust mechanisms to monitor non-
Palanpuri employees, they are predominantly owned by Palanpuris and rely on Palanpuri 
cutting expertise.  Over 95% of the 2,400 members of India’s Gem and Jewelry Export 
Promotion Council and the leaders of all seven of the nation’s largest companies, which 
control 25% of the country’s diamond exports, are Palanpuri Jain.  Like the Ultra-
Orthodox, the Palanpuris are a very tightly knit community and have developed active 
community associations in the diamond centers where they reside.123 
 
 
                                                
Interestingly, another ethnic sect is active in the diamond industry.  Angadias, 
which in Gujarati means “one who carries valuables” or “trustworthy person,” serve the 
important role of transporting diamonds from the Mumbai to Gujarat for cutting.  
Angadias are recruited only from the Patel community in Gujarat’s Mehsana district and 
have traveled the Mumbai-Gujarat route for more than 125 years, beginning with camel 
caravans and now traveling third-class on express trains.  A typical troupe of 30 
Anagadias – plainly dressed, unarmed, and carrying unmarked canvas sacks – will 
transport $4 million in diamonds each day while earning salaries of less than $50 a 
month.  Like the Ultra-Orthodox, the Anagadias are secretive and insular, with one 
noting, “Anagadias like me will bring only persons that we know into the business 
because our personal honor and career is at stake.”124 
 
 The central role of community connections in India’s diamond industry is 
consistent with the model developed for the Ultra-Orthodox merchants, but that does not 
suggest – nor does the model imply – that Patel Anagadias and Palanpuri diamond cutters 
use the same enforcement mechanisms found in New York’s Ultra-Orthodox 
communities.  How those communities police behavior and appropriately punish 
uncooperative individuals is, while tremendously interesting, beyond the scope of this 
paper.  It is probably safe to speculate that the communities distribute some form of 
excludable community club good in a way that the Ultra-Orthodox dole out community 
religious goods, and thus the members of the Anagadia and Palanpuri communities may 
also have a form of joint utility function.  Nonetheless, the critical conclusion here is that 
these middlemen and independent contractors pose the same end-game problem 
presented by diamond brokers, and the community connection that enforced contracts in 
New York seems to have a counterpart in the Indian hinterland. 
 
More generally, the structure of the Indian diamond networks provides 
particularly strong evidence for the Section IV hypotheses that articulate how Jewish 
diamond merchants enforce their informal contracts.  Both Indian and Jewish merchants 
have achieved prominence but through independent historical paths.  The similarities of 
the two ethnic-based diamond networks illustrate that each group has developed near-
identical responses to the difficulties of transacting diamonds.  Family and community 
institutions are efficient responses to the hazards implicit in diamond contracts. 
 
123 Gita Paramal BUSINESS MAHARAJAS; Gita Piramal FINANCIAL TIMES June 19,1990;  
124 Manjeet Kriplani, September 11, 2000; Sanjoy Hazarika “India’s Flourishing Couriers” NEW YORK 
TIMES September 23, 1985, Section D, pg. 10; Jonathan Karp “Call Them the Icemen: India’s Angadias 
Tote Diamonds in the Rough” WALL STREET JOURNAL March 9, 1999, pg. A1. 
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Hong Kong 
 
 
                                                
Asians are relative newcomers to the world of diamonds.  First, only recently did 
Asian societies become sufficiently affluent to serve as significant consumers of luxury 
goods such as diamonds.  Now, merchants from all of the world’s diamond centers come 
to Asian markets, particularly to Hong Kong’s bourse, to sell their finished goods (as one 
traveling salesman emphasized, “People think we come to Asia to buy diamonds.  No no.  
We come here to sell diamonds.”125).  Many Indian and Jewish family businesses have 
relatives living in Hong Kong selling the stones their relatives send from Antwerp, Israel, 
and elsewhere. 
 
 Asia also has recently assumed a second role as a cutting center.  Many Israeli and 
Indian companies have set up operations in Thailand, China, and other nearby countries, 
taking advantage of low labor costs and trying to recreate the success of Indian cutting 
factories.  Rough diamonds are brought to Hong Kong, sold to a local concern, and then 
brought to a cutting factory in Mainland China.  Like much other commerce in China and 
Southeast Asia, the Asian companies that deal in diamonds and organize cutting 
enterprises are family-based networks.126  Complicated joint ventures between non-
Chinese investors and Chinese businessmen provide for the introduction of Indian and 
Israeli cutting technology to these factories, but the family networks assume the difficult 
tasks of transporting the diamonds to the factories in China and supervising the workers.   
 
 The central role of family businesses in Hong Kong’s diamond trade, though 
consistent with the pattern in other diamond centers, is not a remarkable feature for 
Chinese commerce.  The fascinating addition Hong Kong’s trade makes to this discussion 
is its handling of disputes.  Like other diamond centers, Hong Kong has a bourse with an 
arbitration board, procedures for dispute resolution, and trading rules that structure 
exchange.  The rules allow merchants from other centers to trade with Chinese merchants 
and with each other within a system of exchange that resolves disputes and enforces 
reputation mechanisms like those in other bourses.127  However, the bourse’s arbitration 
system is never used to resolve disputes between two Chinese businessmen.  The only 
reasonable inference is that the Chinese networks resolve their disputes through different, 
and secretive, mechanisms.  Whatever those mechanisms are, they – or supplemental 
mechanisms – must also spread information about individuals’ actions, support reputation 
mechanisms,128 and serve the other functional purposes that New York’s arbitration 
system fulfills. 
 
 
125 Interview with the author, October 1996. 
126 See, e.g., Wiedenbaum & Hughes (1996). 
127 These rules and arbitration system are also in place so the Hong Kong bourse can conform to the 
standards set by the World Federation of Diamond Bourses. 
128 This supposes that Chinese networks rely on some form of reputation mechanism as well.  This need not 
be the case.  Other methods of private ordering – including violence – can adequately police behavior and 
punish non-cooperation.  Nonetheless, any enforcement mechanism must have access to sufficient and 
reliable information about individuals’ actions. 
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 In sum, Hong Kong’s diamond trade provides further support to the centrality of 
family businesses in trading diamonds.  But the real lesson the city offers is that New 
York’s system of private ordering is not the only available mechanism.  The Chinese 
networks somehow disseminate information and enforce informal contracts without 
relying on the bourse’s arbitration system.  The overlying structure may be the same, but 
the details are strikingly different. 
 
Israel 
 
 Immigrants from Amsterdam and Antwerp first brought the diamond trade to 
Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s, but Palestine’s cottage industry did not experience 
significant growth until after World War II began.  Palestine became a refuge for Jewish 
diamond merchants during the German occupation of the Netherlands and Belgium and 
quickly became a major diamond center.  Palestine’s diamond industry suffered briefly 
during the years leading up to Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 (which, in part, 
helped Antwerp regain its prominence after World War II) but again experienced rapid 
growth in the 1950s and eventually became the world’s largest exporter in the early 
1980s. 
 
 Israel’s current diamond industry has many of the same features present in the 
other diamond centers, particularly New York.  Diamond companies are family-based 
companies, and Israel’s diamond bourse, the Israel Diamond Exchange, will now only 
admit new members who are relatives of current members.  Also like New York, many 
Ultra-Orthodox occupy the Diamond Exchange serving as brokers for large diamond 
merchants, and between 30-40% of all Exchange members are Ultra-Orthodox.  Family 
relationships and the Ultra-Orthodox community are both important components in 
operating the industry. 
 
 The development of Israel’s diamond cutting industry, however, reveals a slightly 
different institutional picture than those in other centers.  During the industry’s growth in 
the 1950s and 1960s, there were more opportunities for entry than there were in other 
cities.  This appears to be a small exception to the requirement of a family or community 
connection.  Many of Israel’s early diamond merchants have stories similar to the path 
that brought Moti Owenstein’s father into the industry.  Moti tells his story: 
 
“My father was 19 when he came to Israel as a refugee from Europe.  When he came, he had no 
family and no profession, but he came upon a diamond merchant who gave him an entry-level job 
as a polisher.  Slowly he learned the trade, and eventually he acquired an inventory of his own, 
opened up his own factory, and became a successful dealer.”129 
 
The possibility of a New York or Antwerp diamond merchant hiring an unknown 
individual who is not in his intimate religious circle is nearly unthinkable, and it is very 
unlikely in modern-day Israel as well.  Nonetheless, Israel’s early industry grew on these 
kinds of stories.  Refugees and recent arrivals obtained jobs in small cutting facilities that 
employed no more than 10-15 people.  After acquiring industry knowledge and skills, 
                                                 
129 Interview with the author, February 2002. 
48 
they, perhaps with a partner or two, opened their own small operations with 10-15 
workers.  Accordingly, the industry grew rapidly and incorporated more and more new 
workers. 
 
Today, such free entry is unavailable at least partly because Israel’s cutting 
industry has, like Antwerp’s, gone overseas to where labor is less expensive.  While 
Israel still has a large cutting industry, most of Israel’s new activity in diamond cutting 
involves the export of cutting technology to factories in Asia and India, and much of this 
international activity is conducted by family businesses that send relatives to remote sites 
across the globe.  The industry was open to outsiders only during its rapid expansion, and 
the second generation of diamond merchants, who are less in need of new workers than 
their forefathers, have not opened the industry to outsiders. 
 
 It is tempting to discount the brief period of entry to extenuating circumstances.  
During the 1950s, Israel’s industry was growing rapidly and was in desperate need for 
new labor to support a promising industry in an otherwise struggling economy.  Also, 
Israel was home to thousands of World War II refugees who were desperate for work, 
and several Israeli government agencies were active in searching for new sources of 
diamonds as a way to buttress the emerging polishing trade.  These explanations, 
however, discount the contracting challenges and the threat of theft.  A better explanation 
probably lies in a strong, pan-national connection that Israelis shared in the aftermath of 
the Holocaust, where fervent national ties simulated intimate ethnic relations.  Even so, 
the leap from family and community relationships to broader national connections is a 
difficult one to make, but perhaps the enforcement mechanisms that govern the Ultra-
Orthodox have an analog for countrymen in a small and intimate nation.  For sure, the 
early days of the State of Israel were unique, and the nation’s diamond industry during 
those years appears to be a narrow exception to the family-community hypothesis. 
 
Jewish Merchants and Other Trades with Informal Contracts  
 
 The previous discussions in this section illustrate that diamond merchants outside 
of New York also rely on similar family and community ties to govern diamond 
exchange.  A further implication of the model described in Section IV is that if Jewish 
diamond networks indeed were structured to enforce informal contracts, then those same 
networks should manage commerce in other goods that similarly rely on informal 
contracts and private ordering.  Consequently, one would expect to see Jewish merchants, 
using the same family and community relationships, transacting in commodities that 
present difficult contracting hazards for time-inconsistent exchange. 
 
 One obvious modern-day example of commodities that rely on informal contracts 
is illegal goods.  Sales contracts for illegally traded goods are not enforceable by public 
courts, so any time-inconsistent exchange would rely on private ordering.  Consistent 
with this implication, several Jewish diamond merchants have been associated with such 
illegal activity.  In 1999, Russian authorities apprehended several Ultra-Orthodox Jews 
for illegally smuggling assorted goods from the country, including diamonds and antique 
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Hebrew books.130  More dramatic, The New York Daily News reported that Israeli drug 
dealers harnessed Jewish diamond networks to smuggle Ecstasy into New York, where 
Ultra-Orthodox couriers typically transported 30,000 to 45,000 pills and as much as 
$500,000 in drug proceeds.131 
 
History contains more examples of Jewish activity in commerce involving 
difficult to contract time-inconsistent exchange.  Goods, like diamonds, that were small, 
portable, and valuable commodities all created contracting difficulties before there was 
reliable enforcement of contract law.  Jewish merchants transacted in many of these 
trades.  In the Middle Ages, Jews became prominent in the trade for expensive dye-stuffs, 
as Jewish merchants based in Egypt and Tunisia managed the distribution of reseda from 
India and exported saffron and indigo from Tunisia and Egypt to Southern Europe.  They 
remained active in the trade through the reign of the Ottoman Empire.132  Jewish 
craftsmen in the Middle Ages also found lucrative careers working in fine metals, as 
many of 12th century’s goldsmiths in Egypt, Iraq, Persia, Yemen, and Maghreb were 
Jewish.  Jews also were prominent goldsmiths in 15th century Spain and Portugal (where 
some even transgressed Jewish law to manufacture Christian religious artifacts) and in 
central Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries.133  Since the social structure of the Jewish 
community before the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century was insular, intimate, and 
fostered interdependency – very similarly organized as today’s Ultra-Orthodox 
community – it is likely that community institutions and norms were critical in governing 
these trades. 
 
Above all other commercial activity, pre-Enlightenment Jewish businessmen 
engaged in banking and money lending, a trade in which time-inconsistent exchange is 
central.134  Jewish historian Cecil Roth writes, “The Jew was the classic money-lender of 
the Middle Ages, and the classic profession of the medieval Jew was money-lending.”135  
Jewish bankers emerged in Baghdad in the ninth century, engaging in what was called by 
their Caliphite and Fatimid rulers called Jahbadhiyya, a form of banking based on the 
savings of the whole Jewish merchant class (as opposed to the savings of a few rich 
                                                 
130 “Israeli held on charges of smuggling diamonds.”  Jewish Telegraphic Agency, March 3, 1999. 
131 Samuel M. Katz, “Israel Has Long Been Known For Its Wholesome Carmel Oranges and Leather 
Sandals.  Today, Israelis Have a Virtual Monopoly on the Global Trade of Ecstasy.”  MOMENT August 
2001, pg. 89-91. 
132 Baron, et al. (1975), pp. 162-3. 
133 ibid, pp. 164-5.  Baron, et al., also note, “That this was a widespread Jewish occupation in Muslim 
countries may be explained by the contempt in which artisans were held by the Arabs.” 
134 When Jews lent money to non-Jews, they tended to secure their loans through rent charges on fixed 
property, i.e. they secured the right to receive for a limited time revenues flowing from a building or farm 
(they generally were not permitted to own property outright, or they feared expropriation).  Other securities 
included a diverse assortment of pledges, including the armor of impoverished knights to the books of 
university students.  These securities translated a loan and repayments into a sort of simultaneous exchange.  
See Marcus Arkin ASPECTS OF JEWISH ECONOMIC HISTORY (Jewish Publication Society: 
Philadelphia, 1975), p. 67. 
 The centrality of time-inconsistent exchange arose when Jewish bankers pooled their community’s 
resources.  They were able to collect deposits from their community members and credibly assure 
repayment and interest. 
135 Cecil Roth “Essays in Bibliography and Criticism XLV. The Economic History of the Jews.” 
ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW vol. 14, no. 1 (1961). 
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individuals, which was a far more common means to accumulate and dispense capital).  
Europe saw its first Jewish bankers within the administration of the Merovingian kings in 
481.  With the rise of the First Crusade in the 11th century and rising repression 
throughout the 12th-15th centuries, when Jewish merchants were precluded from most 
crafts and endangered when traveling for commerce, Jews turned chiefly to loan-banking 
for sustenance.  A typical story occurred in the southern French town of Perpignan.  As 
the city experienced rapid economic growth in the 13th century, local artisans experienced 
a shortage of capital and saw a high interest rate.  In response, a notable influx of Jewish 
settled in the town, and eventually 80 percent of the sizable Jewish community engaged 
in money lending to their Christian neighbors.  When the local economy slowed, Jewish 
merchants either turned to less lucrative roles as pawnbrokers or sought opportunity 
elsewhere.136  Such economic cycles provided sufficient demand for Jewish capital 
throughout the Middle Ages, and Jewish activity in European banking circles lasted 
through the 19th and into the 20th century.137 
 
Jewish economic history reveals that Jewish merchants excelled in trades that 
relied on time-inconsistent exchange of valuable and portable goods.  The history 
certainly reveals that oppression from European and Arab rulers steered Jewish 
merchants into these trades, either because they were excluded from other professions or 
because they preferred trades that did not require fixed investments vulnerable to state 
confiscation.  Nonetheless, Jewish merchants would not have found success in these 
professions had they been unable to govern time-inconsistent exchange.  The sources of 
success for modern day Jewish diamond traders are likely to resemble the sources of 
success for these other Jewish merchants in history. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Jewish predominance in the diamond industry is explained by the community’s 
efficient enforcement of informal contracts.  This paper illustrates how community 
institutions within the Jewish community provide Jewish merchants with a competitive 
advantage over outsiders and how the private system of diamond exchange is superior to 
institutional alternatives.  Intergenerational family firms enable reputation mechanisms to 
enforce cooperation among long-term dealers, and intimate community institutions police 
the behavior of short-term, independent players.  The result is an active system of 
commerce characterized by highly incentivized independent agents, reliable contracts that 
enable time-inconsistent exchange, and a private enforcement system that rejects public 
courts.  Community institutions are central in explaining both the industry’s infrastructure 
and the industry’s leaders. 
 
The particularly interesting feature of this system of economic organization is the 
role assumed by Ultra-Orthodox Jews.  The Ultra-Orthodox provide critical value-added 
services that add significant efficiency to the system of exchange.  They work as skilled 
                                                 
136 R. W. Emery THE JEWS OF PERPIGNAN IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY: AN ECONOMIC 
STUDY BASED ON NOTARIAL RECORDS (Columbia Univ. Press: New York, 1959); see also Roth 
(1961) and Arkin (1975), pp. 57-63. 
137 ibid, 211-225. 
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diamond cutters whose polishing increase the sales prices of stones, and they play the 
essential role of middlemen brokers who match certain stones with the buyers who most 
value them.  Their ability to assure compliance of informal contracts makes their valuable 
participation difficult to replace and provides the Jewish merchants with a competitive 
advantage over rival merchant groups without such community foundations.  This paper 
makes the empirical contribution of articulating specifically how these community 
institutions serve important economic functions.  Where the literature connecting social 
structure with economic performance frequently rests on generalities, this paper provides 
a detailed investigation and a formal economic model that explains with precision how a 
community induces cooperation from its members. 
 
 However, the end of the Ultra-Orthodox’s role in the diamond trade may be at 
hand.  Two major recent developments are exerting powerful forces that may irreversibly 
change the diamond industry and obviate the contributions the Ultra-Orthodox make.  
The first, mentioned periodically in Section V, is the utilization of low-cost labor to cut 
and polish diamonds.  Previous to the explosion of Indian cutting factories, diamonds 
were chiefly polished in Antwerp, New York, and Israel by family businesses and 
independent cutters.  Now, while cutters in those diamond centers still polish most of the 
largest and most valuable stones, small stones, which comprise a vast majority of cutting 
activity, are polished in large factories in India and, increasingly, in Asia.  The cutting 
jobs in Antwerp and Israel are fractions of what they used to be – over the last two 
decades, Antwerp has lost nearly 90% of its cutting jobs and Israel approximately 70%.  
Indian and Chinese laborers are assuming the positions long-held by the Ultra-Orthodox, 
and technological innovations, mostly in the form of cutting machinery that replaces 
skilled labor, will accelerate that trend. 
 
 
                                                
A second development is De Beers’ new marketing strategies.  In July 2000, De 
Beers, facing a decline in its market share and thus a dilution of its monopoly rents, 
announced plans to brand its diamonds and market them directly to consumers.  A 
cornerstone of the company’s plan was forming a joint venture in early 2001 with LVMH 
Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton, a French luxury goods conglomerate, that will market 
“designer diamonds” with either an unusual number of facets or a new shape.  In 
addition, De Beers is requiring its sightholders to devise similar strategic plans to market 
brand diamonds to high-end consumers.138  If these marketing strategies work, then 
consumers will be able to purchase a diamond like any other commodity, thus bypassing 
the entire search process where brokers match buyers with specific stones.  Similar 
strategies are being pursued by some Internet diamond brokerages.  Web sites list an 
inventory of diamonds with GIA-certified features and a high-resolution picture, and 
interested buyers negotiate directly with owners without intervening middlemen.  By one 
statistic, Internet sales comprise 15% of all sales in the US, but most merchants are 
skeptical that a picture and GIA categories can relay sufficient information about a 
 
138 See Lauren Weber “The Diamond Game: Shedding Its Mystery” NEW YORK TIMES Section 3, pg. 1.  
Some designer diamonds have already emerged, such as the Escada Diamond with 97 facets (the traditional 
diamond has only 58) or the patented Leo Diamond with 66 facets. 
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stone.139  A sophisticated brand, however, may reduce enough uncertainty to facilitate 
sales where buyers do not examine the stone they purchase. 
 
 
                                                
The diamond industry is now changing rapidly, and the ultimate success of new 
cutting ventures and marketing strategies – and with them, the eventual fate of the Ultra-
Orthodox – may be known soon.  The next decade could mark an important turning point 
in the 1,000 year history of Jews in the diamond trade. 
  
 
139 Sharon Berger “Diamonds in the Rough” THE JERUSALEM POST April 6, 2001, pg. 4B. 
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Appendix A 
 
Consider the following formal depiction of the Prisoner’s Dilemma for the 
diamond transaction.  A simultaneous game where a party decides either to cooperate or 
to defect qualifies as a Prisoner’s Dilemma game if (1) each individual gains more from 
cheating regardless of the other party’s actions, (2) the outcome from both parties 
cooperating is a Pareto improvement over the outcome when both parties cheat, and (3) if 
the result from either party defecting is socially inferior to an outcome with mutual 
cooperation.  Mathematically, if both parties receive a pay-off of 1 if they cooperate, the 
definitional conditions are α > 1 and α – β < 2.   
 
  Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (1, 1) (- β, α)
Defect ( α, - β) (0, 0) 
 
Figure 2: The Traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 
 The result from playing the game only once is that both parties will defect, a 
Pareto-inferior outcome.  In a “Grim Strategy,” cooperation is sustained until one party 
cheats, after which the cheated party (and thus the cheating party as well) will continually 
defect.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma for the diamond transaction is unique because the one-
time benefit from cheating is far above the minimal profits from cooperation; in other 
words, α >>> 1.  Long-term cooperation is sustained, given discount rate δ (where 0 < δ 
< 1), only if 1/(1-δ) > α.  Accordingly, if α >>> 1, parties achieve an equilibrium of 
cooperation only if δ is high and if the players are certain they will benefit from many 
future transactions. 
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